The problem imo is the slow deterioration of institutional knowledge that offloading the mental task of wisdom gathering to AI is causing.
One interesting comparison is to the history of manufacturing. West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China. The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff (such as grill brush [1])
I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
"I'm coding 10x faster"
"look at the output velocity per employee"
"we are producing much more (in China)"
"look at profit / number of (manufacturing) employers"
Seems ok if you're American / Chinese but I'm struggling to understand how the rest can be OK with allowing institutional knowledge to deteriorate while having an active dependency to the former two. We already see this with the tech dependency towards USA and manufacturing competition from China.
It is not unsurprising to find dev lacking knowledge in domain stuff that would be actually required if they were doing the development themselves, rather than outsource it to an LLM.
So the client who writes the ticket understand the domain, the LLM that implement it understand it too.
There is more to development than domain knowledge. There are decades of wisdom about development best practices on how to keep a large codebase maintainable, performant, testable, etc. that LLMs frequently don't follow. And now humans aren't practicing those skills either or passing down lessons learned to the next generation of programmers.
Maybe it will be no big deal, and nobody will read code anymore, but it is understandable why somebody might be concerned about it.
The outsourcing of manufacturing was largely influenced by the externality of environmental pollution. People wanted to live in clean habitats. We had rivers on fire for weeks, extinction of species, and horrible pollution causing cancer and birth defects. Giving "the commies" the dirty, dangerous jobs, and moving everyone up into middle management and white collar knowledge work was seen as an evolution of the economy.
The political move to put all of that death and destruction onto China, where environmental regulation is willfully ignored in the interest of economics, was a smart move on their end.
We lost so much intellectual knowledge and other "tribal" technology in these processes to this outsourcing, which is unfortunate. We're almost having to rebuild our manufacturing from first principles, which may not be a bad thing.
it wasn't completely abolished. but the economics forced out the low-value-added work, only high-value manufacturing (and politically important manufacturing) remained.
Clean Air Act was passed in 1963. the Clean Water Act was passed in 1972. The China Shock began in 2000 after PNTR.
Avoiding environmental regulation was one reason to move factories to China, avoiding unions and high wages was another.
But the local communities weren't demanding that their factories be moved overseas so they could have a clean if impoverished towns. Your entire causality is completely backwards.
It isn't 100% causality, but it was definitely one of the ways it was sold to people through PR/propaganda.
Free trade / globalism was the larger "true" move, and yes getting away from unions and high wages to maximize profits was a big part.
Corporations made a change from valuing stakeholder value (employees, communities, customers, suppliers, the nation) to pure shareholder value (profits over everything else, despite the long term result that profits by any and all means hurts all stakeholders and eventually can cannibalize the company unless you have monopolistic moats).
I promise you the people in the towns where the factories were closing were 100% against it. And the corporations never tried to claim that "at least your town will be cleaner" probably because they were mostly leaving behind superfund sites they were trying to avoid cleaning up.
Was the New Yorker crowd clinking glasses together talking about how good it was to get the dirty steel mills out of the country? Sure maybe but this argument never resonated with anyone on the ground.
Were companies actively moving factories offshore so they could be dirtier because they didn't have to comply with American environmental laws? Absolutely.
This hit close to home and I giggled over it for about 5 minutes. Both Europe and the US have so much potential but they're both mismanaged albeit in slightly different ways. There should be some way out of this mess.
I recommend <a href="https://sharecleaner.com/" rel="nofollow">https://sharecleaner.com/ for cleaning links of trackers when sharing from mobile. No affiliation, just a user on iOS.
> I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
There were all these theories like Comparative Advantage that people would trot out to point out that, if you don't like outsourcing, not only are you ignorant and backwards you're also probably racist.
I specifically remember seeing the ricardian tables, featuring 8th grade math proving how competitive advantage means everyone wins. This was very persuasive to me as a college sophomore, all my professors were on board and I was young.
I remember being a young guy, blue collar background, but in the left-wing anti-globalization movement (think Seattle WTO protester types).
When I was in college or going to parties with New Yorker Reader types I'd try to argue against globalization and they would start smugly dropping their theories on me. I was too young and naive to refute them in any kind of convincing way, but my life experience told me that it was wrong.
But it was pervasive in the zeitgeist. Basically anyone trying to argue against it was backwards and stupid, or shrill if they were lefty.
I wonder if the exact date of anti-globalization switching from being a "left populism" to "right populism" thing could be determined.
However I'm not sure it could really be stopped or whether it was inevitable from containerization. Can you really prevent people from getting cheaper products forever?
Again containerization happened in the 1970s and 1980s. The China Shock was 2000-2010.
What technology was invented in 2000 that allowed everything to go to China? No technology. That was the year the US adopted Permanent Normalized Trade Relations with China. It was a government policy change!
By the way the US already had trade relations with China. All PNTR did was promise not to change the policy in the future. That was the starting gun that signaled to all American companies that they should start investing in production in China.
So would globalization happen on some scale just because of the march of technology? Sure. But the way it happened, the speed at which it happened and the extent to which it happened, were the result of policy choices.
I'm pretty sure that China demonstrating that they are a stable country, that they want foreign investment, that they won't gank your investment two weeks after you make it, and that they aren't going to do another Great Leap Forward may have had something to do with why foreign investment in it skyrocketed.
This sort of thing takes time, and by the 00s, enough time (and a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation) passed, and foreign investors were gaining confidence.
The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week.
> a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation
No, but there definitely was a much slower gradual repression over a longer period, with a final round of protest repression: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_protests" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_pr...
> The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week
Amen. A two-pole model is simple and attractive but the rest of the world is also, you know, doing stuff and buying things. America can, for example, preserve its car industry by refusing to allow Chinese EVs, but will gradually discover it has become uncompetitive overseas.
Completely agree Jiang Zemin spent the 1990s courting global capital.
The point is that it wasn't technology it was policy, on the Chinese and American side, that drove the China Shock.
This was also what a lot of anti-globalization people were say at the time. The pro-globalization people were saying not only is it good but it's inevitable. There Is No Alternative.
The anti globalization people were saying if it's inevitable why does it need all these policy changes, trade agreements, and bigwig conferences?
Those would be part of the mechanisms of inevitability (under that hypothesis). Globalization is a phenomenon at the human societal level, they would be predicting human behaviors, it's not like rocks and rivers were going to precipitate it. It's not like those singular events "changed everything" either, it's an accumulation of decades of social sentiments, purchasing decisions, etc.
This whole subthread is from like an alternate timeline where the world actually found out or agreed that globalization was bad and stopped or slowed it somehow? Did the US meaningfully take back manufacturing or something?
If globalization is not inevitable, what's the alternative?
The globalization we are talking about here is not inevitable, and it is facilitated by global capital with their own interest in mind and in order to exploit the working classes in cheaper labor markets...
This is true, but, in their efforts to chase short term gains, they are moving us towards your "true globalization" whether they intend to or not. That's kind of the inevitability. You can't send all that economic activity and resources over there without lifting them up. They are inexorably chipping away at the reserves of cheap labor to arbitrage.
Another good example is how these trade deals strip liability at the border.
I recall an example of when a Mexican worker in an LG plant lost her hands in a poorly-maintained stamping press. Theoretically Mexico has robust worker protection laws, but in reality the courts are corrupt and controlled by the maquiladoras.
So instead lawyers tried to sue LG in US court on her behalf. In fact they sued the actual TVs being imported by LG US that were made in her factory, the same way counterfeit goods are sued and arrested at the border by intellectual property owners.
The US judge dismissed the case arguing that the TVs were owned by LG US, who bought them in Mexico from LG Mexico. Both companies being owned by the same parent company is irrelevant to the law which saw them as completely separate entities and neither LG US nor the TVs it bought have any responsibility for the conditions in the Mexican factory.
Now if the drafters of NAFTA cared at all about worker conditions they could have easily made liability follow the goods across the border the same way they made copyrights and trademarks follow the goods across the border. They did not care about the workers and in fact they saw the mistreatment of workers as an advantage of the free trade deal.
Yeah, it's tough, there are a lot of discouraging developments and backwards things still going on. I don't think it anybody would claim that it would all happen within our lifetimes. And even in the long term, I can't say whether we're headed toward an ever-widening gap between the haves and have-nots or a more egalitarian society, but there are some positive indicators. And I think the "global community" is steadily pulling together (when looking over the whole timespan of civilization).
anti-Globalization on the right has nothing in common with anti-Globalization on the left. The only thing they share is the name. And is probably the reason we don‘t call it anti-globalization any more, but rather simply anti-capitalism or more accurately anti-global capitalism, or anti-imperialism. Anti Neo-colonialism used to be popular but is already (and rightly so) falling out of fashion.
Even back then people on the left had a problem with the term globalization. On the left it was wildly recognized that the term came from the right to decorate global capitalism and (what was then called) Neo-colonialism in a more palatable light for liberals. In Iceland we used to make fun of it and said it should instead be called Americanization.
Right-wing anti-globalization is basically just hating foreigners (except white Americans), and supporting border fascism. Interestingly the right wing types in Europe love American culture, and have no problem with America spreading their capitalism and Neo-liberalism world wide (they only hate it when the EU does it).
>Can you really prevent people from getting cheaper products forever?
Do you even want cheap products? We're all trapped in low-quality-product hell together, and some of us have realized we'd be less frustrated and less poor with something at least not-quite-so-low-quality.
If people could have realized that sooner, and if there had been some vision or political will at the top, stopping this would've been a matter of very boring policy decisions. It wasn't inevitable. Containerization might have made it easier, but it didn't make it irresistible.
Anti-globalization is not right-wing, at least here in France. Right parties and the extraparliamentary right are very happy to have cheap goods from China, oil from the middle east, and gaz from Russia. Hell, even the neo-fascist (which directly descends from actual nazis) Front National regularly has their propaganda manufactured in China.
Right-wing parties are very opposed to organic food and local production, and always defend transnational treaties. Hell, even Mercosur, which Marine Le Pen spent years arguing against, 100% of Front National MPs voted for it.
So beyond that words come out of these lying scumbags, i'd be curious how you came to this idea that anti-globalization is right and not left?
> But it was pervasive in the zeitgeist. Basically anyone trying to argue against it was backwards and stupid, or shrill if they were lefty.
It was so very weird. Even in Ireland (which was the target of the first wave of US outsourcing), people seemed to believe that everyone could be "knowledge workers" and that industry was unimportant.
I still don't really get why everyone believed this, but they did. Something something Upton Sinclair I guess.
Yes, economists famously do, and they also lack intelligence and knowledge given that their theories keep being proven wrong by reality but they never update them.
Economists have effectively become a priestly class, dressing up the ruling ideology in "science-y" robes so as to communicate authority. All social sciences are at risk of doing so, but they fall right into this hole the instant that they don't perceive the world as it exists.
A trained economist either sells out to the Overlords or he gets a job as a barkeep. Or he ends up as some crank in a half-forgotten nonprofit somewhere. There's no middle ground.
Human intelligence is a remarkable adaptation, but "tendency towards delusion" might be the decidedly maladaptive trait that comes with it.
It's like saying that the Titanic was at risk of sinking after it hit the iceberg.
> A trained economist either sells out to the Overlords or he gets a job as a barkeep.
That's what training is for.
> Human intelligence is a remarkable adaptation, but "tendency towards delusion" might be the decidedly maladaptive trait that comes with it.
I'd say the reason is more external than internal - personal interest is a mind bender.
And they were right. American manufacturing is $3 trillion/year, second only to China, and 1/5th of the entire world. American built airliners and American built engines fly all over the world. Millions of American cars come out of factories every year. American rockets put more into orbit than everyone else combined.
The idea that the US lost its manufacturing is not based in reality. One reason people think that is because people think cheap plastic crap and consumer electronics when they think “manufacturing.” Another reason is that US manufacturing has become highly efficient and automated, so a fairly small portion of the population works in it.
Yeah, your iPhone wasn’t built in the US. But the plane that got it here probably was.
Among others, yes. Nearly $100 billion in revenue last year. From your snark I guess we’re not supposed to count a manufacturer with revenue equaling the GDP of a small country because they’ve had some quality issues?
Boeing is not a healthy company it's a deeply sick company with a horrible internal culture. I know because I've spoken with people who work there.
The fact that leadership is focused on extracting profits out of the enterprise is also not a show of strength. It's a demonstration that they're trying to drain whatever value is left in it.
This is pretty much true of any of the American "greats:" Boeing, Intel, GE, GM, Corning. They're producing (or have recently been producing) great profits because they're eating their own seed corn. Nobody expects them to still be the businesses they currently are in another few decades.
One other metric the parent didn't mention: The US is #1 in the world in productivity per worker in manufacturing.
We're not the largest in absolute output, but we are literally the best manufacturer in the world, and we are the 2nd largest.
We manufacture lots of stuff, often the most state of the art and difficult things to manufacture. We're very good at it.
And we've sat around close to full employment for so long, the only way to convert more of the economy to manufacturing is to either import workers, cannibalize other sectors of the economy, or automate even more.
Yes, a larger share of the economy is services, but is there some objective optimal ratio of services to manufacturing we should be shooting for? If so, what is it? No one ever says.
Yeah but something something testosterone manliness degeneracy decadence.
Sending emails from an ergonomic chair for eight* hours a day and having to be civil to female coworkers and polite to your boss inherently degrades the male spirit in a way that permanently damaging and poisoning your body with 12-hour factory shifts with a foreman yelling at you doesn't. This is so self-evident and obvious that nobody even bothers to state it, it's just an assumed undercurrent in discussions of "bullshit jobs" etc.
If you can’t see the direction and velocity of China you’re beyond hope
Americans cars are falling behind, they rely heavily on American cultural exports which relies on the world not thinking Americas are twats because the voted for Trump. Germany alone is over twice the size of America in terms of car exports. Including domestic destinations then china is three times the size of America.
America planes fall out of the sky far too often as Boeing pivoted from engineering to politics
Musk does good rockets. Not America. China is catching up and lost to overtake unless starship proves itself; and if it does China will copy that too.
Chinese planes are increasing very year, comac now about 15% of traffic, and heading towards about 20% in a decades time. and Boeing is about the same size as airbus at 40% each which will shrink as china catches up, won’t surprise me in 2050 is the largest provider of passenger planes is Chinese.
And do you know where the tools and dies to make those things come from? Where the robots that work at those lines come from? Where the chips in those robots at those lines come from?
Hint: not here. Even basic machining is cooked here. Go on Xometry and compare the pricing of any simple design made in USA vs. China and you’ll see, we can’t competitively do the basics anymore (you conflate basic with crap).
If you go back to WWII America was the China of the world: mass produced products if midrange quality.
Europe owned high end quality, especially Germany.
Most Radar technology was invented in the UK and then sent to the USA where American engineers would redesign it for mass production. You'd have a magnetron that the British machined at great expense and the Americans would redesign it so it could be stamped out by the thousands.
Germans would look at the wrecks of bombers they shot down. Early on they'd look at a B17 and say "this thing is crude" but by 1944 they'd look at a late model bomber and say "we don't even know how they made some of this stuff".
People have it entirely backwards. They think if you can do high end manufacturing the low end is easy. In fact if you can do mass production of low end parts with consistent quality then high end stuff is easy.
We can't manufacture most of those low-end things at competitive prices with developing nations - and we never will be able to (or else we have bigger problems).
So who's going to buy the low-end stuff at high-end prices?
You can try tariffs and the like (as we're foolishly doing right now) - that usually ends up having the opposite intended effect. You make everything more expensive domestically, including manufacturing (b/c your inputs got more expensive), and hurt our ability to export, even the things we did well.
Meanwhile, the rest of the world unencumbered with protectionism reaps the benefits of free trade and out competes us.
All this eventually leads to a loss of manufacturing jobs and output and manufacturers that can only sell to the domestic market (instead of the whole world). The whole sector starts to shrink. So that's no good.
America has lots of natural resources (even more when we're friendly with Canada) cheap electricity, good transportation infrastructure (historically).
China has to import much of their raw materials. Wood from SEA and Russia, oil from the middle east and Russia, even coal, ore and beef cattle from Australia! They don't have the water supply, forests, mines or oil that exist in North America.
There is no good reason for them to be the manufacturing center of the globe and there were rational reasons why the US was the center of manufacturing in the globe in the 20th century.
The reason they became the global center of manufacturing was policy choices in China and the US at the turn of this century, and the reason why they remain the center of manufacturing is they developed a massive amount of capital and know-how in an era where the USA was actively destroying its own.
China has plenty of coal. They import metal refining coal, which they don’t have. And they import thermal coal because it’s easier to boat the stuff in from Indonesia than move it east by rail from western China.
Australia was never very interested in being a manufacturing power house, they simply don’t have the people for it anyways, and it’s easier to ship raw material than finished goods vast distances. Russia has the same problem in population so China is convenient for them. China would have happened even if the USA didn’t help it along in 80s-90s.
Australia in the mid 70s was party to the Lima Declaration [1]
Presently there's a lot of yap how it didn't or wasn't the reason Australia lost its way to retain its manufacturing sector. Indirectly though it was bouncing around the walls of Govt and industry's board rooms and pushed decisions to reduce or discontinue ongoing training in regard to upskilling, or simply improving skill sets that might be needed in the unemployed working class.
However much of the shift way from general manufacturing was the inevitable result of the declaration, the inability for a small manufacturer in places like Australia to compete with cheap imports - I recall a relative back in 1979 - 80 having a long rant about a manufacturing company near him - the whole problem was the small dry cells the company purchased at quantity to install into an electronic device - the exact same branded dry cells were available to their oversea competition for next to nothing and could / did sell their version cheaper than the purchase price the company was paying for the batteries per unit.
The other part of the issue was those industries that opted to hang on - the bogey man here again was the thinking that it would be better / overall cheaper for manufacturing sector to be elsewhere overseas. Thus with this mindset setting fruit in the higher branches of the wealth market, there was not much help from Industry heads or Govt at the time to encourage or provide affordable means for whichever industry still hanging on, to modernise - textile being one that comes to mind. I actually had a strong belief (I knew no better from the propaganda being dribbled out,) 80s / early 90s that the reason the textile and clothing industry was falling off was overseas workers were paid a pittance, which made it hard for textile companies here to stay competitive - that was until someone who'd had travelled and had business interests though Asia and the US dispelled the usual propaganda I'd been suckling on, she corrected me on that it's not all sweat shops, and much of the textile base over in Asia had modernised quickly and been computerised for years.
This also applies to the UK: major manufacturer of turbines, i.e. Rolls Royce in Derbyshire. More electronics than you'd expect, but all short-run highly specialized things like satellites and scientific instruments and Martin-Baker ejection seats.
Massive numbers of people on production lines is not coming back. The rest of the economy is too well paid for that and automation too advanced. VW will retain car manufacturing in Europe by automating away its workforce, at the cost of high redundancies.
> And they were right. American manufacturing is $3 trillion/year, second only to China, and 1/5th of the entire world.
Values are 2021 because that's the most recent available for US at the same source, to keep consistent.
World Manufacturing output: 16.16 trillion <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD
US Manufacturing output: 2.5 trillion (15.47% of world)
<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=US" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...
China Manufacturing output: 4.85 trillion (30.01% of world)
<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=CN" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...
Whatever analysis you make, let's use the correct numbers, from which you were off by about 1/5th. Should you think that is a negligible margin, you'd have to consider the US participation in global manufacturing output as similarly significant.
Ok thank you for finding more up-to-date data for US manufacturing GDP. Let's re-do the analysis with 2025 data, because I draw the line at using annualized data for a year that has not yet ended.
World total: 17.6 trillion (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=CN" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...)
US: 2.961 trillion, 16.82% of world
China: 4.82 trillion, 27.38% of world total
So you were very much closer to the 3 trillion figure (again, 2026 annualized data is not current, it's forecast). Still quite off from the 1/5th of total. About the same as the EU - 3.03 trillions for 2025 (<a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/euu/european-union/manufacturing-output" rel="nofollow">https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/euu/eur...)
In terms of participation in world total the US has come down from 22.44% in 1997 to 16.82% in 2025 losing 5.38 percentage points or a loss of over 1/5th in less than 30 years.
I'd say there is some justification to claim a decline in US manufacturing.
Again thank you for engaging productively and providing up to date data. I feel like I should offer praise as I chastised you for cursing at me for using data 4 years out of date.
There’s a decline in the relative share, but that’s down to the rest of the world growing. Adjusted for inflation, 1997 was slightly below the current figure. That’s nothing to brag about, but it’s a far cry from the “we don’t make anything anymore” narrative I see so much.
Where it has declined substantially is employment. That peaked at almost 20 million at the end of the 70s and is now under 13 million.
> The idea that the US lost its manufacturing is not based in reality.
But I disagree with your claim that people are right in being extremely dismissive of losses in US manufacturing.
>> Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
Interpreting that as a complete loss of manufacture capacity I agree with you, with the qualification that concerns of relative decline were justified since there was a definite decline in aggregate.
I have to say that overall I don't think economies and citizens of these economies should prefer certain economic activities over others. In principle I think specialization is a good thing. On the other hand, I do think that the US has committed some strategy mistakes in terms of how much manufacturing activity was moved out of the country and how dependent it has come to be on foreign supplies of, for instance, rare earths and advanced IC.
But that analysis is predicated on US strategic goals and geopolitical intent. The coming impasse over Taiwan with China is almost completely self imposed due to the prioritization of short term corporate profit over strategic goals.
But that is a different conversation altogether. I think data from the past 30 years show that alarmism over de-industrialization was overblown as you said AND that there has been nonetheless a significant decline in the previously absolutely dominant position of the US economy in global manufacturing. If that is good or bad, to whom or to what ends, is way outside the scope of internet forum messages.
I'm sure fresh numbers are available, they're just unpublished.
We could do some educated guessing here - in the last 5 years China's economy grew at the rates of 8.6%, 3%, 5.4%, 5%, 5%, the US grew at 6.5%, 2.5%, 2.9%, 2.8%, 2.2%. We can extrapolate the manufacturing numbers based on that, which would give some advantage to the US because the US manufacturing lags the average, while the Chinese leads it.
The ecosystem to build cheap physical products is incredibly important for creating new wealth. If you're building something new, in manufacturing cities in China you can walk across the street and get everything you need. In the U.S. you have to fly to China and build relationships with Chinese suppliers. Which means creation of new products, which is where most future wealth will come from, is extremely difficult. This is like Germany lacking a meaningful tech ecosystem because creating tech startups is so difficult.
We can make planes and engines because we kept the expertise, and we can make rockets because of herculean efforts of a few people. This simply isn't good enough, we need to make creating new physical things as easy as possible.
That's manufacturing based in dollars which is quite misleading. Rolling with your example of planes, this [1] is how a 737 looks in terms of manufacturing. Boeing does a lot of assembling, but the majority of the manufacturing is outsourced.
When people think of manufacturing they generally think of going from basic materials to something useful, rather than 'just' assembling quite advanced parts. Like if I go buy some parts and 'build' a PC that'd technically be manufacturing, and quite high value manufacturing if I was able to sell it at a good markup.
I think one other point is that demand for American goods has never been higher. I've had Europeans come to me with tears in their eyes saying 'sir, sir, we want more Fords'. There has never been a better car brand than an American one, that's for sure.
>“we don’t make anything anymore” narrative I see so much."
This conflating US financializing manufacturing vs actual industrial capacity, i.e. the entire manufacturing by value / MVA "cope". US objectively doesn't make much relative to past and a lot of shit US makes, US doesn't actually make, others does the actual making while US financializes and capture via spreadsheet maxxing, hedonic adjustments etc, and do insert "I made this meme" on things US fundamentally did not "make"
Like US does make some legitimate frontier stuff in house - the reality is is in aggregate industrial base terms, US MAKES / FABRICATES very little vs pre industrial chain hollow out, US does import a lot of subcomponents that others make, integrates, or outsource actual MAKING abroad while capturing intangibles like IP/patent fees that get bundled up into value add stats, but when people talk about making they're talking about extraction to factory gate pipeline. Not US can sell a bunch of foreign made goods with some CONUS final assembly or IP accounting because muh smile curve that attributes disproportionate "value" to US "makers". Consider a US widget co imports $10 of components assembles and sells for $40, the statistically manufacturing value add is $30 even though US did very little making. Now add tariffs, regulatory capture etc and widget sells for $50 and that's $40 of MVA for basically doing minimal M. Said US widget factory makes 10 widgets and adds $400 to MVA. Meanwhile a PRC widget company makes 100 identical widgets at $2 each... but their MVA is only $200, but they did literally all the making. These two industrial bases are not the same. Then a few years later, US BLS/BEA applies a statistical adjustment because widget X is slightly more performant... (prevalent in tech), so that widget is now listed as $100 equivalent utility, so hey manufacturing expanded (it didn't).
SpaceX... doesn't make that much... they make a few thing that are reusable and due to techstack can lift a lot, i.e. operational improvement (not discounting how game changing resuable is). But compare to PRC, who made like 2x-3x more first stages, i.e. their output is significantly higher, which is to say SpaceX is "making" at about American scale. For reference Boeing like ~30% domestic content, US auto ~50%. Reality is the ONLY thing US is REALLY good at making is refined fossil, agri, wood products etc. Almost everything else US very good at making money, but not the stuff.
TLDR US got much better at MAKING money from other people MAKING things. The other caveat is regulatory capture = US grossly overpay for mediocre shit, a lot of stuff that makes in US are just... not good, i.e. vehicles, but people trapped paying domestic premium which inflates value add but not actual relevant when people discuss US making things. US broadly makes a lot of mediocre overpriced things while population stuck shopping in company store for large items, that looks good on value add / productivity stats... but it's not reflection of industrial capacity which is what people think about in terms of real manufacturing.
Why are you championing a system that benefits a smaller minority of people every year? Americans don't prosper when Apple sells iphones. Americans don't prosper when they sell more F150s. The sure as heck don't prosper when Boeing sells 747s either.
You literally are praising a system that condemned tens of millions of Americans to abject poverty because the rich wanted slightly better returns.
How is that the case? Apple, Ford, and Boeing are American companies that hire mostly Americans, with some number of H1-Bs. Those Americans pay taxes in California, Michigan, Washington, and elsewhere, and also to the federal government. Those taxes get redistributed to all of America, as determined by the budget as set by Congress and the President. We can complain about billionaires at the top not paying their fair share, and that the budget isn't set how you would, but largely, that is the deal. The workers on iPhone, the F150, the 7*7 pay their taxes in America. Those three are American success stories.
Boeing builds their planes in America, F150s are largely built in Michigan, iPhones are manufactured in China, but California is much richer because of the taxes that Apple employees pay. Millions of Americans are in poverty according to the latest census, but I don't know how you establish cause for that poverty being "that rich people wanted higher returns".
Those three companies employ hundreds of thousands of Americans. Millions more are employed by suppliers, contractors, dealers, etc. Selling iPhones, F-150s, and 7x7s is how those people make their living. In what sense are they not prospering from that?
Americans are better off than they've ever been. The improvement has disproportionately gone to the wealthy, but even the poorest have seen gains, not losses.
I don't understand this kind of comment. It's like some sort of disaster fantasy. Like you need it to be a crapsack world full of slums, so you come up with absurd takes like American companies employing huge number of Americans not contributing to American prosperity, and just make up troubles.
What many people don't realize is why is America suddenly caring about manufacturing everything inhouse when Elites decided earlier Globalization was good, because China wants to command respect more than America. That is also the reason why Gold is pushing higher. If China was nobody, no nation would care for gold. So all these unnecessary downstream reasons distort what is actually going on.
If there was no China, Globalization would spread very strongly with Bangladesh manufacturing clothes and Milan doing the fashion show. All those calculations are coming undone. So please keep this main reason front and center when we discuss this matters.
That’s a good point. I’m also going to bring race into this and say it’s also because the Chinese are not white. The same type of rhetoric was said about Japan in the 80s, but barely about Germany.
Even with how long Russia has been an antagonist, they are still seen as a “wayward brother.”
Toyota would have gone bankrupt in post-War Japan if it wasn't from massive US demand in the Korean War.
The Vespa popularized by Hollywood's Roman Holiday propped up a post-War Italy.
Ping-Pong Diplomacy of the 70s gifted China its electronics manufacturing (think: PONG) turning it from a 3rd world backwater to what it is today. The exchange was in removing the 'Gang of Four' and the drugs associated with it.
---
The US was put into a privileged position as reserve currency of the WORLD in Bretton Woods. This is with the understanding/responsibility that the US would act as World Police and prop up foreign economies.
How come we cannot keep/define "specs" of how to manufacture such "mundane" objects such as a grill brush, everything from what raw materials are required, how should the assembly line(s) look like, which industrial robots or their human professional alternatives are required, etc. etc.
It just seems to me that fundamentally this is a knowledge organization problem.
Grill brush found out that the problem is chinese products are so much cheaper (without ascribing cause of that) that north american producers can only compete on native advertising (B2C) or purchasers that require a north american supply chain (B2B).
I think you missed their conclusions. The problem wasn't that China was a lot cheaper. The problem was that substantial subcomponent or process vendors only exist in china. Like, they could find American sheet metal stamping companies but they were all using custom tooling made in China because American tooling doesn't exist anymore.
Tooling is a high-skill trade. America used to be amazing at tooling. What's more, tooling isn't super cost sensitive because one tool can make thousands of parts.
When outsourcing to China began the tools would be made in the USA and shipped to China for the low-skill work. But over time those Chinese manufacturers figured out the tooling. What's more they realized that controlling the tooling would let them control the whole process.
They started doing things like, for instance, including the tooling in the price of the product so you don't even see it, if you use their tools. Just send them the cad file and they'll do the rest. So American tool making went away. But this was a conscious decision on the part of the Chinese manufacturer and an unconscious decision on the part of American importers who didn't really value their in-house expertise.
> The problem was that substantial subcomponent or process vendors only exist in china.
He found vendors in USA. They didn't call him back.
USA has manufacturing. But Americans want to drive cars and own their own home. In order to achieve that American manufacturers need high volume or high margin - better BBQ scrubber isn't either of those.
> What's more, tooling isn't super cost sensitive because one tool can make thousands of parts.
Tool making is highly sensitive to labor cost. Every article is a one-off. It can't be automated, often not even duplicated. There are tool and die makers in the USA but if you want to make consumer products you can't afford American tool and die because American tool and die makers want to drive cars and own their own homes. Chinese tool and die makers don't have the same expectations.
> So American tool making went away.
It didn't go away. You just don't know about it.
I'm agreeing with you, in that yes it would be best and simple to solve "How come we cannot..." with some basic steps - but companies and industries often cut corners to the point of barely being viable long term.
This analogy really only works assuming that maintaining [insert company]'s institutional expertise requires N engineers to maintain individual lines of code manually.
This is already showing not to be true with AI. Institutional knowledge is not the same as knowing how to implement low-level software details. Even today, every company does not need engineers to remember git cli syntax by memory, how to write parsers for JSON, or write the large amount of boilerplate from scratch that is at every software company. Most company's already hire engineers who have zero experience in the existing code base, yet they are productive despite this lack of institutional knowledge. For a company to maintain institutional knowledge they may only need N/K engineers.
This breaks down at a sectorial level. If one company offloads that knowledge to the wider economy/world, fine. But if <<all> the companies in a domain/sector do it at the same time, at some point the destruction is extremely hard to undo.
We were already there at places with a lot of contractors, capped at 1 or 2 year stays. You saw teams of 10, 20, with 2 people with serious institutional knowledge. Now the contractors are just Claude
What really doesn't make sense to me is setting uniform token targets for all engineers. I'd be more interested in setting token ranges with hard limits for certain roles that see diminishing returns from the overuse of coding agents and where maintaining institutional knowledge, architectural awareness... is more valuable than moving as fast as possible. Like everything else, these limits should be adjusted over time as tooling for those roles improves but it really feels like there are human limits that organizations should avoid exceeding.
> West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China. The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff
Americans produce the highest technology equipment in the world. Our machining base is structurally sound, but its all making weapons, so you don't hear about it.
It's true that China benefitted immensely from outsourcing, but they took the jobs Americans didn't want. It's the same with immigration today - folks cross the Rio Grande to do chores that Americans won't, or others fly in and work for nothing in academia while they wait for their PhD.
> The problem imo is the slow deterioration of institutional knowledge that offloading the mental task of wisdom gathering to AI is causing.
Have you considered the institutional knowledge could actually be actively preserved and distributed with AI? The kind of tacit knowledge that is situated and not readily preserved in a book might be absorbed by thinking machines and proliferated to the next person who needs it. The caveats would be trade secrets, skill differentiators, that people might not be willing to discuss, and manufacturing secrets of national importance. Maybe you can think of others.
>Have you considered the institutional knowledge could actually be actively preserved and distributed with AI?
Well that's what this whole debate comes down to. And, to my mind at least, it's a rare case of an actually interesting question about AI, because like the article says, it can plausibly deteriorate exactly that kind of knowledge. But as you note, it can also maintain it.
I think there's a sense in which it might do both at the same time. AI's version of on call tacit knowledge might be something like lazy-loading just-in-time tacit knowledge, but at the cost of who knows what cognitive paths we might have by keeping that knowledge resting in-house. We would gain real efficiency but we wouldn't know we wouldn't know.
>The kind of tacit knowledge that is situated and not readily preserved in a book might be absorbed by thinking machines and proliferated to the next person who needs it. The caveats would be trade secrets, skill differentiators, that people might not be willing to discuss, and manufacturing secrets of national importance. Maybe you can think of others.
It's funny that you credit AI with this (and I don't disagree), because tacit knowledge was exactly the thing Hubert Dreyfus spent a career insisting computers would never have, and his wisdom was taught to generations of undergraduates across the country and world who treated it as received wisdom and still is regarded as such in certain academic corners.
> I think there's a sense in which it might do both at the same time.
This is probably true.
Many artisan fabric techniques were lost when industrial looms displaced those jobs. But heavy industry enabled cloth to be manufactured at a rate that people were free to spend their time and money on other priorities - and now (centuries later) the society is in a sufficiently advanced stage of development that the old techniques are being rediscovered.
Perhaps the example underscores the importance of thoughtful preservation of insitutional knowledge.
I edited that sentence to try and clarify a bit, but Dreyfus was a continental philosopher out of Berkley active basically from the 1950s to the 2010s. He engaged in decades of friendly debates with other philosophers about the limits of computers.
When he described those limits, he always frustrated computer scientists and analytic philosophers because he spoke in a kind of informal philosophical vocabulary and didn't really formalize his ideas. So he would say computers didn't have things like "tacit knowledge" or "insight" and he railed against "symbol manipulation". Famously he declared chess would never surpass human expert play. He wrote a book called "What Computers Can't Do" and another called "What Computer's Still Can't Do".
I personally think his argument was laughably wrong if well intentioned. But some people think it was respectable. I think in the present day, he's often rehabilitated with a kind of apologetic reinterpretation, such that things like transformers, weights, vectors, etc were what he really meant all along.
I think he was not wrong that some higher layer of sophistication would prove to be necessary, but he was wrong, I think definitively, to think that "symbol manipulation" of computers was a kind of category error. Even today's best models are still running on logic gates over 1's and 0's, and it was his failure of imagination to doubt that those could be the conceptual bedrock for AI, tacit knowledge and all.
He passed away in 2017, which is too bad because I would have loved to have seen his interpretation of things like GPT-6 Astra.
> think that "symbol manipulation" of computers was a kind of category error
This is where we do drift off into the semantic bog. If there is tacit knowledge in an LLM, then where is it? It must be in the weights, and it must have somehow come from the training data. Therefore the weights represent "compressed" knowledge. Is that then not "tacit" since it's explicitly encoded?
You'll get no disagreement from me here. But be ready because some people live to debate this, and Dreyfus is the poster child for a whole philosophical tradition.
I think what it comes down to, is trying to turn the specialness of human intelligence into undefinable magic, essentially playing god of the gaps with the concept of human insight. So by design, it has to be something that can't be amenable to any formal representation like weights.
> Famously he declared chess would never surpass human expert play. He wrote a book called "What Computers Can't Do" and another called "What Computer's Still Can't Do".
He never made such a claim. In the introduction to the 1972 print of this book he discusses the forecasts from Turing to his time of computers' abilities to play chess and the then state of the art. He criticizes the early optimism in 1950s mentioning that in 1957 H. Simon though in 10 years computers would excel in chess.
Dreyfus goes on to discuss the history of forecasts and progress in computer chess in a nuanced and highly informative analysis.
Whatever your opinion of his work I don't think it's fair to say his arguments are "laughably wrong" at any turn. I haven't read his books in detail but from what I know he made great contributions to the dialogue about technology and I don't know any instance of his making crass predictions or anything that he wrote that could be labelled "laughable".
Dreyfus certainly claims he was mischaracterized, but what he "really" said always turns out to be a conveniently moving target.
He thought that the complexity of chess rendered it solvable in principle but "uncomputable" in practice. You're right that he was speaking to the times he was familiar with, and what he meant by "impossible in practice" was something like letting a 1Mhz computer explore all the possible chess moves from now until the heat death of the universe. Relying on that to insist that computers defeating humans in his lifetime was consistent with what he envisioned stretches past charitability and into sophistry.
And I don't think you can do that without also extending the same charity toward proponents of computer intelligence he was critiquing, and if you do that his thesis, which was disproportionately preoccupied with retelling the failures of the 1950s over and over again using them to represent the whole of computing while the world moved on, because the same charitable repairs extended the other way make AI into something less easily caricatured, and still based on the same logic gates and 0s and 1s he was criticizing.
If that's not enough, Dreyfus explicitly said that what was lacking in chess programs was (1) any practical ability to do the brute forcing needed, (2) any kind of nim-style logical shortcuts around brute forcing or (3) any kind of expert level heuristics because he categorically believed those simply weren't programmable. And he believed that those exhausted the options. [1]
There's no version of this that can be correct because even if you think he's right that chess engines got better by progressing to some different conceptual paradigm, that paradigm is still embodied in same logic gates and 1's and 0's that he thought only pertained to prior paradigms he was criticizing. He was wrong to assume such things as "heuristics" were out of that scope.
> Americans produce the highest technology equipment in the world. Our machining base is structurally sound, but its all making weapons, so you don't hear about it.
It's also very automated so the jobs went away, but the US continues to manufactures a lot of things.
>Have you considered the institutional knowledge could actually be actively preserved and distributed with AI? The kind of tacit knowledge that is situated and not readily preserved in a book might be absorbed by thinking machines and proliferated to the next person who needs it. The caveats would be trade secrets, skill differentiators, that people might not be willing to discuss, and manufacturing secrets of national importance. Maybe you can think of others.
You don't develop "institutional knowledge" from a few prompts. It takes years to develop them.
>The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff
Right. And the spin I would put on your point: while the U.S. could never compete with outsourced labor, institutional manufacturing expertise could (you would think) still be valuable to startups finding some kind of niche in the manufacturing space.
With all this new 3D printing infrastructure, and constantly improving robotics, maybe some manufacturing efficiencies in some spaces could emerge that compete on cost and outcompete the cost of shipping stuff across an ocean. The availability of institutional expertise could be one of the necessary ingredients for mixing and matching the way to a new efficiency.
Yeah it's bleak in terms of automating away labor, but I'd like to think robotics is the next automated frontier after LLMs and we want to get there first.
Peace through global interdependence wasn't a bad side effect at all. The analogy only holds so much, but I'd wholly agree that any profound deterioration of skills across the board would create dependencies on AI infra that are on a whole new level.
At the very latest, when "AGI robots" will be commonplace and taking on the most crucial labour on our behalf.
We have significantly degraded in our ability to memorize e.g. epic poems or preserve oral traditions since the advent of writing.
I know that sounds trite in retrospect, given the benefits, and that's half the point. But there are real tradeoffs too! For example, culture has a LOT more generation-to-generation turnover as a result of literacy being common, making it unstable.
I think (?) my point was that Socrates equated Memory with Wisdom, and the invention of writing would impact Memory and thus Wisdom. I believe he was just plain wrong. Equating (manual) coding/code-review with Wisdom makes the same category error.
Writing had been invented three thousand years before Socrates
The passage criticizing the "invention of writing" is a quote from a legend where a Pharaoh passes negative judgement to a god, by the way, who had invented writing in the story.
Ironically, the dialogue in question, Phaedrus, is about the dangers of misreading text. It discusses writing political speeches not writing per se.
Was Socrates even wrong, though? There have certainly been millions of words written that were lacking in wisdom and have convinced people of falsehoods to their detriment! When’s the last time you saw a debate be reasonable? devoid of cheap jokes or hot takes? actually change someone’s mind? or the whole audience’s mind?
In the world where we didn’t outsource Western manufacturing to China, our homes would not be overflowing with disposable junk; in the world where the Luddites won, our wardrobes would not be stuffed full of disposable clothes; perhaps in the world where Socrates won our minds would not be jammed full of nonsense.
It's not really a case of 'winning' though is it? There is no agreed criteria by which to judge which is going to pass muster for a majority of people (both in Socrates time and ours).
I mean, you can s/“won”/“had their ideas reach a supermajority in the population such that their future (and our present) resembled the future they wanted instead of the future they worried the target of their ire would (and did) bring about”, or equivalent, at your leisure - I think my point stands either way.
One affects memorization and is a trade-off for writing, a process that arguably allows someone to work through their own knowledge of a subject and find or realize gaps in understanding.
Having something else do all of that for you is completely different and essentially tossing any gain outside of the creation of some gray slurry of an output in the trash.
No, it wasn't. This often made claim is based on a passage of Phaedrus where Socrates is quoting an Egyptian legend, and the negative judgement of the invention of writing is done by a pharaoh inside that legend being told inside the dialogue.
Besides, the dialogue is not about writing itself, but about writing down political speeches and the consequences and impact of political speeches being read rather than heard.
Also, the dialogue dates from about three thousand years after writing was invented.
Some direct quotes from the dialogue:
SOCRATES: So, it is obvious to everyone that speech writing is not shameful, not in itself anyway (258d)
SOCRATES: We are left with the question of the appropriateness and inappropriateness of writing, and how it may be executed in a worthy or an inappropriate manner. Do you agree? (274b)
And this, a very relevant insight for an age when some are convinced that text analysis should suffice for intelligent work:
SOCRATES: Then a person who thinks he has left a skill in writing behind him, and anyone who, for his part, inherits this on the assumption that something clear and certain will emerge from writing, would be full of enormous silliness, and indeed ignorant of the prophetic words of Ammon in believing that written words are anything more than a reminder to a person who already knows whatever it is that the written words may refer to.
Ironically, the sharpest criticism Socrates made of writing in the often misread Phaedrus was of misreading texts.
I think this is a good point but we should see AI at the person level.
For your example, not all companies/people manufacture, but everyone has access to AI.
Soon a lot of people will lose skills to AI and at some point we would need them back and there won't be many skilled workers with it
I've been taking a "help me help myself" approach to interactions with LLMs. I might run my plan on how I'm going to build something past an AI asking it to critique it. I then incorporate that info into my original plan, or not. However, I am responsible for the design, I write the code. I started doing this because for decades I've been building my own programs since I learned to code just for the sheer fun of it (like many here) and I don't want to give that up to LLMs. I might as well let them play my video games for me.
I wish more people would at least consider this idea.
> The problem imo is the slow deterioration of institutional knowledge that offloading the mental task of wisdom gathering to AI is causing.
That's the whole point of Global managerial class even without AI. The idea is just by creating metrics one can measure how teams, groups, organization and whole industries are performing.
Before the current AI complex the previous one Agile Industry Complex One can see we starting producing 10x more code, 50x more JIRAs resolved, 100x more network bandwidth used. All these metrics tremendous gain in productivity.
Also it may not have been seen in US but in many places a change in political regime does want to burn down previously collected institutional knowledge because new dispensation have their own idea about what is knowledge, who will preserve it and how it will be preserved.
> West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China.
Bogus nonsense.
1. Manufacturing output in West/America is higher than it ever was in history.
2. What has reduced over time is the number of people employed in manufacturing, not manufacturing output. And that's an effect of automation, same as it happened over centuries in agriculture.
3. West/America did not decide anything, the realities of capitalism did.
You're either a capitalist and embrace efficiency of producing where it makes sense (for many different reasons) or you're fine with inefficient third-tier industries.
The tax payer may help a handful of sectors that would otherwise die survive if they are truly critical for national security, but just a handful, not all of them.
Most of us can't hunt either. Somethings go away in time because they're no longer needed (by the masses). That is essentially what society does -- it allows us to multiply a few for the benefit of many so the many can focus on other things.
The resilience is more in ensuring archival process to ensure it's never lost forever, and a continuity plan to ensure enough (but few) people still know.
Well I have seen many mediocre folks who confidently operate in India as they have licenses and things just work their way (CAs, lawyers, even a lot of diagnostic Doctors serving the very bottom and whose modus operandi is simply giving an antibiotic for everything). I am hoping that good AI will lift a lot of the mediocre ones at least 1 SD above.
NalNezumi · · focus · HN ↗
One interesting comparison is to the history of manufacturing. West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China. The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff (such as grill brush [1])
I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
"I'm coding 10x faster" "look at the output velocity per employee"
"we are producing much more (in China)" "look at profit / number of (manufacturing) employers"
Seems ok if you're American / Chinese but I'm struggling to understand how the rest can be OK with allowing institutional knowledge to deteriorate while having an active dependency to the former two. We already see this with the tech dependency towards USA and manufacturing competition from China.
[1] <a href="https://youtu.be/3ZTGwcHQfLY" rel="nofollow">https://youtu.be/3ZTGwcHQfLY
lolakutty · · focus · HN ↗
So the client who writes the ticket understand the domain, the LLM that implement it understand it too.
The dev is the only one that is clueless.
camdenreslink · · focus · HN ↗
Maybe it will be no big deal, and nobody will read code anymore, but it is understandable why somebody might be concerned about it.
lolakutty · · focus · HN ↗
Without domain knowledge, the dev will miss critical simplifications. That is one way the code base accrue complexity.
AnimalMuppet · · focus · HN ↗
lolakutty · · focus · HN ↗
tylerjharden · · focus · HN ↗
The political move to put all of that death and destruction onto China, where environmental regulation is willfully ignored in the interest of economics, was a smart move on their end.
We lost so much intellectual knowledge and other "tribal" technology in these processes to this outsourcing, which is unfortunate. We're almost having to rebuild our manufacturing from first principles, which may not be a bad thing.
mitxela · · focus · HN ↗
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
tylerjharden · · focus · HN ↗
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Avoiding environmental regulation was one reason to move factories to China, avoiding unions and high wages was another.
But the local communities weren't demanding that their factories be moved overseas so they could have a clean if impoverished towns. Your entire causality is completely backwards.
tylerjharden · · focus · HN ↗
Free trade / globalism was the larger "true" move, and yes getting away from unions and high wages to maximize profits was a big part.
Corporations made a change from valuing stakeholder value (employees, communities, customers, suppliers, the nation) to pure shareholder value (profits over everything else, despite the long term result that profits by any and all means hurts all stakeholders and eventually can cannibalize the company unless you have monopolistic moats).
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Was the New Yorker crowd clinking glasses together talking about how good it was to get the dirty steel mills out of the country? Sure maybe but this argument never resonated with anyone on the ground.
Were companies actively moving factories offshore so they could be dirtier because they didn't have to comply with American environmental laws? Absolutely.
jorgeteixe · · focus · HN ↗
bigbadfeline · · focus · HN ↗
mitxela · · focus · HN ↗
Do not share videos with si parameters. It links together the accounts of the sender and receiver.
NalNezumi · · focus · HN ↗
toomuchtodo · · focus · HN ↗
mitxela · · focus · HN ↗
blooalien · · focus · HN ↗
@mitxela: Thank to for taking a moment of your time to educate those who didn't know.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
There were all these theories like Comparative Advantage that people would trot out to point out that, if you don't like outsourcing, not only are you ignorant and backwards you're also probably racist.
[deleted] · · focus · HN ↗
[deleted]
nixon_why69 · · focus · HN ↗
I guess we were all lacking wisdom.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
When I was in college or going to parties with New Yorker Reader types I'd try to argue against globalization and they would start smugly dropping their theories on me. I was too young and naive to refute them in any kind of convincing way, but my life experience told me that it was wrong.
But it was pervasive in the zeitgeist. Basically anyone trying to argue against it was backwards and stupid, or shrill if they were lefty.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
However I'm not sure it could really be stopped or whether it was inevitable from containerization. Can you really prevent people from getting cheaper products forever?
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
What technology was invented in 2000 that allowed everything to go to China? No technology. That was the year the US adopted Permanent Normalized Trade Relations with China. It was a government policy change!
By the way the US already had trade relations with China. All PNTR did was promise not to change the policy in the future. That was the starting gun that signaled to all American companies that they should start investing in production in China.
So would globalization happen on some scale just because of the march of technology? Sure. But the way it happened, the speed at which it happened and the extent to which it happened, were the result of policy choices.
vkou · · focus · HN ↗
This sort of thing takes time, and by the 00s, enough time (and a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation) passed, and foreign investors were gaining confidence.
The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
No, but there definitely was a much slower gradual repression over a longer period, with a final round of protest repression: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_protests" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_pr...
> The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week
Amen. A two-pole model is simple and attractive but the rest of the world is also, you know, doing stuff and buying things. America can, for example, preserve its car industry by refusing to allow Chinese EVs, but will gradually discover it has become uncompetitive overseas.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
The point is that it wasn't technology it was policy, on the Chinese and American side, that drove the China Shock.
This was also what a lot of anti-globalization people were say at the time. The pro-globalization people were saying not only is it good but it's inevitable. There Is No Alternative.
The anti globalization people were saying if it's inevitable why does it need all these policy changes, trade agreements, and bigwig conferences?
jrowen · · focus · HN ↗
This whole subthread is from like an alternate timeline where the world actually found out or agreed that globalization was bad and stopped or slowed it somehow? Did the US meaningfully take back manufacturing or something?
If globalization is not inevitable, what's the alternative?
runarberg · · focus · HN ↗
jrowen · · focus · HN ↗
This is true, but, in their efforts to chase short term gains, they are moving us towards your "true globalization" whether they intend to or not. That's kind of the inevitability. You can't send all that economic activity and resources over there without lifting them up. They are inexorably chipping away at the reserves of cheap labor to arbitrage.
runarberg · · focus · HN ↗
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
I recall an example of when a Mexican worker in an LG plant lost her hands in a poorly-maintained stamping press. Theoretically Mexico has robust worker protection laws, but in reality the courts are corrupt and controlled by the maquiladoras.
So instead lawyers tried to sue LG in US court on her behalf. In fact they sued the actual TVs being imported by LG US that were made in her factory, the same way counterfeit goods are sued and arrested at the border by intellectual property owners.
The US judge dismissed the case arguing that the TVs were owned by LG US, who bought them in Mexico from LG Mexico. Both companies being owned by the same parent company is irrelevant to the law which saw them as completely separate entities and neither LG US nor the TVs it bought have any responsibility for the conditions in the Mexican factory.
Now if the drafters of NAFTA cared at all about worker conditions they could have easily made liability follow the goods across the border the same way they made copyrights and trademarks follow the goods across the border. They did not care about the workers and in fact they saw the mistreatment of workers as an advantage of the free trade deal.
jrowen · · focus · HN ↗
alchemism · · focus · HN ↗
runarberg · · focus · HN ↗
Even back then people on the left had a problem with the term globalization. On the left it was wildly recognized that the term came from the right to decorate global capitalism and (what was then called) Neo-colonialism in a more palatable light for liberals. In Iceland we used to make fun of it and said it should instead be called Americanization.
Right-wing anti-globalization is basically just hating foreigners (except white Americans), and supporting border fascism. Interestingly the right wing types in Europe love American culture, and have no problem with America spreading their capitalism and Neo-liberalism world wide (they only hate it when the EU does it).
NoMoreNicksLeft · · focus · HN ↗
Do you even want cheap products? We're all trapped in low-quality-product hell together, and some of us have realized we'd be less frustrated and less poor with something at least not-quite-so-low-quality.
If people could have realized that sooner, and if there had been some vision or political will at the top, stopping this would've been a matter of very boring policy decisions. It wasn't inevitable. Containerization might have made it easier, but it didn't make it irresistible.
selfhoster1312 · · focus · HN ↗
Right-wing parties are very opposed to organic food and local production, and always defend transnational treaties. Hell, even Mercosur, which Marine Le Pen spent years arguing against, 100% of Front National MPs voted for it.
So beyond that words come out of these lying scumbags, i'd be curious how you came to this idea that anti-globalization is right and not left?
disgruntledphd2 · · focus · HN ↗
It was so very weird. Even in Ireland (which was the target of the first wave of US outsourcing), people seemed to believe that everyone could be "knowledge workers" and that industry was unimportant.
I still don't really get why everyone believed this, but they did. Something something Upton Sinclair I guess.
miyoji · · focus · HN ↗
Yes, economists famously do, and they also lack intelligence and knowledge given that their theories keep being proven wrong by reality but they never update them.
lopsotronic · · focus · HN ↗
A trained economist either sells out to the Overlords or he gets a job as a barkeep. Or he ends up as some crank in a half-forgotten nonprofit somewhere. There's no middle ground.
Human intelligence is a remarkable adaptation, but "tendency towards delusion" might be the decidedly maladaptive trait that comes with it.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
natsucks · · focus · HN ↗
bigbadfeline · · focus · HN ↗
It's like saying that the Titanic was at risk of sinking after it hit the iceberg.
> A trained economist either sells out to the Overlords or he gets a job as a barkeep.
That's what training is for.
> Human intelligence is a remarkable adaptation, but "tendency towards delusion" might be the decidedly maladaptive trait that comes with it.
I'd say the reason is more external than internal - personal interest is a mind bender.
Henchman21 · · focus · HN ↗
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
The idea that the US lost its manufacturing is not based in reality. One reason people think that is because people think cheap plastic crap and consumer electronics when they think “manufacturing.” Another reason is that US manufacturing has become highly efficient and automated, so a fairly small portion of the population works in it.
Yeah, your iPhone wasn’t built in the US. But the plane that got it here probably was.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
The fact that leadership is focused on extracting profits out of the enterprise is also not a show of strength. It's a demonstration that they're trying to drain whatever value is left in it.
This is pretty much true of any of the American "greats:" Boeing, Intel, GE, GM, Corning. They're producing (or have recently been producing) great profits because they're eating their own seed corn. Nobody expects them to still be the businesses they currently are in another few decades.
SmirkingRevenge · · focus · HN ↗
We're not the largest in absolute output, but we are literally the best manufacturer in the world, and we are the 2nd largest.
We manufacture lots of stuff, often the most state of the art and difficult things to manufacture. We're very good at it.
And we've sat around close to full employment for so long, the only way to convert more of the economy to manufacturing is to either import workers, cannibalize other sectors of the economy, or automate even more.
Yes, a larger share of the economy is services, but is there some objective optimal ratio of services to manufacturing we should be shooting for? If so, what is it? No one ever says.
BobaFloutist · · focus · HN ↗
Sending emails from an ergonomic chair for eight* hours a day and having to be civil to female coworkers and polite to your boss inherently degrades the male spirit in a way that permanently damaging and poisoning your body with 12-hour factory shifts with a foreman yelling at you doesn't. This is so self-evident and obvious that nobody even bothers to state it, it's just an assumed undercurrent in discussions of "bullshit jobs" etc.
hdgvhicv · · focus · HN ↗
Americans cars are falling behind, they rely heavily on American cultural exports which relies on the world not thinking Americas are twats because the voted for Trump. Germany alone is over twice the size of America in terms of car exports. Including domestic destinations then china is three times the size of America.
America planes fall out of the sky far too often as Boeing pivoted from engineering to politics
Musk does good rockets. Not America. China is catching up and lost to overtake unless starship proves itself; and if it does China will copy that too.
Chinese planes are increasing very year, comac now about 15% of traffic, and heading towards about 20% in a decades time. and Boeing is about the same size as airbus at 40% each which will shrink as china catches up, won’t surprise me in 2050 is the largest provider of passenger planes is Chinese.
edot · · focus · HN ↗
Hint: not here. Even basic machining is cooked here. Go on Xometry and compare the pricing of any simple design made in USA vs. China and you’ll see, we can’t competitively do the basics anymore (you conflate basic with crap).
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Europe owned high end quality, especially Germany.
Most Radar technology was invented in the UK and then sent to the USA where American engineers would redesign it for mass production. You'd have a magnetron that the British machined at great expense and the Americans would redesign it so it could be stamped out by the thousands.
Germans would look at the wrecks of bombers they shot down. Early on they'd look at a B17 and say "this thing is crude" but by 1944 they'd look at a late model bomber and say "we don't even know how they made some of this stuff".
People have it entirely backwards. They think if you can do high end manufacturing the low end is easy. In fact if you can do mass production of low end parts with consistent quality then high end stuff is easy.
SmirkingRevenge · · focus · HN ↗
So who's going to buy the low-end stuff at high-end prices?
You can try tariffs and the like (as we're foolishly doing right now) - that usually ends up having the opposite intended effect. You make everything more expensive domestically, including manufacturing (b/c your inputs got more expensive), and hurt our ability to export, even the things we did well.
Meanwhile, the rest of the world unencumbered with protectionism reaps the benefits of free trade and out competes us.
All this eventually leads to a loss of manufacturing jobs and output and manufacturers that can only sell to the domestic market (instead of the whole world). The whole sector starts to shrink. So that's no good.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
China has to import much of their raw materials. Wood from SEA and Russia, oil from the middle east and Russia, even coal, ore and beef cattle from Australia! They don't have the water supply, forests, mines or oil that exist in North America.
There is no good reason for them to be the manufacturing center of the globe and there were rational reasons why the US was the center of manufacturing in the globe in the 20th century.
The reason they became the global center of manufacturing was policy choices in China and the US at the turn of this century, and the reason why they remain the center of manufacturing is they developed a massive amount of capital and know-how in an era where the USA was actively destroying its own.
seanmcdirmid · · focus · HN ↗
Australia was never very interested in being a manufacturing power house, they simply don’t have the people for it anyways, and it’s easier to ship raw material than finished goods vast distances. Russia has the same problem in population so China is convenient for them. China would have happened even if the USA didn’t help it along in 80s-90s.
anenefan · · focus · HN ↗
Presently there's a lot of yap how it didn't or wasn't the reason Australia lost its way to retain its manufacturing sector. Indirectly though it was bouncing around the walls of Govt and industry's board rooms and pushed decisions to reduce or discontinue ongoing training in regard to upskilling, or simply improving skill sets that might be needed in the unemployed working class.
However much of the shift way from general manufacturing was the inevitable result of the declaration, the inability for a small manufacturer in places like Australia to compete with cheap imports - I recall a relative back in 1979 - 80 having a long rant about a manufacturing company near him - the whole problem was the small dry cells the company purchased at quantity to install into an electronic device - the exact same branded dry cells were available to their oversea competition for next to nothing and could / did sell their version cheaper than the purchase price the company was paying for the batteries per unit.
The other part of the issue was those industries that opted to hang on - the bogey man here again was the thinking that it would be better / overall cheaper for manufacturing sector to be elsewhere overseas. Thus with this mindset setting fruit in the higher branches of the wealth market, there was not much help from Industry heads or Govt at the time to encourage or provide affordable means for whichever industry still hanging on, to modernise - textile being one that comes to mind. I actually had a strong belief (I knew no better from the propaganda being dribbled out,) 80s / early 90s that the reason the textile and clothing industry was falling off was overseas workers were paid a pittance, which made it hard for textile companies here to stay competitive - that was until someone who'd had travelled and had business interests though Asia and the US dispelled the usual propaganda I'd been suckling on, she corrected me on that it's not all sweat shops, and much of the textile base over in Asia had modernised quickly and been computerised for years.
[1] <a href="https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2012-10/Lima%20Declaration%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action%20on%20Industrial%20Development%20and%20Co-operation_26.3.1975_0.PDF" rel="nofollow">https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2012-10/Lima%20Dec... [pdf]
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
Massive numbers of people on production lines is not coming back. The rest of the economy is too well paid for that and automation too advanced. VW will retain car manufacturing in Europe by automating away its workforce, at the cost of high redundancies.
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
Values are 2021 because that's the most recent available for US at the same source, to keep consistent.
World Manufacturing output: 16.16 trillion <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD
US Manufacturing output: 2.5 trillion (15.47% of world) <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=US" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...
China Manufacturing output: 4.85 trillion (30.01% of world) <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=CN" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...
Whatever analysis you make, let's use the correct numbers, from which you were off by about 1/5th. Should you think that is a negligible margin, you'd have to consider the US participation in global manufacturing output as similarly significant.
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
Four. 2021 vs 2025. Unless you have numbers from 2026 from the future.
> and you’re going to hassle me about not having accurate figures?
Merely pointing out. The subjective interpretation of the experience is entirely on you.
> What the fuck.
Get more recent numbers that show I'm wrong and your 3 trillion & 1/5th of world total is right then.
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
World total: 17.6 trillion (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=CN" rel="nofollow">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?location...) US: 2.961 trillion, 16.82% of world China: 4.82 trillion, 27.38% of world total
So you were very much closer to the 3 trillion figure (again, 2026 annualized data is not current, it's forecast). Still quite off from the 1/5th of total. About the same as the EU - 3.03 trillions for 2025 (<a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/euu/european-union/manufacturing-output" rel="nofollow">https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/euu/eur...)
In terms of participation in world total the US has come down from 22.44% in 1997 to 16.82% in 2025 losing 5.38 percentage points or a loss of over 1/5th in less than 30 years.
I'd say there is some justification to claim a decline in US manufacturing.
Again thank you for engaging productively and providing up to date data. I feel like I should offer praise as I chastised you for cursing at me for using data 4 years out of date.
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
There’s a decline in the relative share, but that’s down to the rest of the world growing. Adjusted for inflation, 1997 was slightly below the current figure. That’s nothing to brag about, but it’s a far cry from the “we don’t make anything anymore” narrative I see so much.
Where it has declined substantially is employment. That peaked at almost 20 million at the end of the 70s and is now under 13 million.
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
> The idea that the US lost its manufacturing is not based in reality.
But I disagree with your claim that people are right in being extremely dismissive of losses in US manufacturing.
>> Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
Interpreting that as a complete loss of manufacture capacity I agree with you, with the qualification that concerns of relative decline were justified since there was a definite decline in aggregate.
I have to say that overall I don't think economies and citizens of these economies should prefer certain economic activities over others. In principle I think specialization is a good thing. On the other hand, I do think that the US has committed some strategy mistakes in terms of how much manufacturing activity was moved out of the country and how dependent it has come to be on foreign supplies of, for instance, rare earths and advanced IC.
But that analysis is predicated on US strategic goals and geopolitical intent. The coming impasse over Taiwan with China is almost completely self imposed due to the prioritization of short term corporate profit over strategic goals.
But that is a different conversation altogether. I think data from the past 30 years show that alarmism over de-industrialization was overblown as you said AND that there has been nonetheless a significant decline in the previously absolutely dominant position of the US economy in global manufacturing. If that is good or bad, to whom or to what ends, is way outside the scope of internet forum messages.
bigbadfeline · · focus · HN ↗
I'm sure fresh numbers are available, they're just unpublished.
We could do some educated guessing here - in the last 5 years China's economy grew at the rates of 8.6%, 3%, 5.4%, 5%, 5%, the US grew at 6.5%, 2.5%, 2.9%, 2.8%, 2.2%. We can extrapolate the manufacturing numbers based on that, which would give some advantage to the US because the US manufacturing lags the average, while the Chinese leads it.
The math gives us the current values for
World: $19.4 T, (%6.5,%3.4,3x%2.9)
China: $6.3 T - 32.5%,
US: $2.9 T - 15%.
coffeemug · · focus · HN ↗
We can make planes and engines because we kept the expertise, and we can make rockets because of herculean efforts of a few people. This simply isn't good enough, we need to make creating new physical things as easy as possible.
somenameforme · · focus · HN ↗
When people think of manufacturing they generally think of going from basic materials to something useful, rather than 'just' assembling quite advanced parts. Like if I go buy some parts and 'build' a PC that'd technically be manufacturing, and quite high value manufacturing if I was able to sell it at a good markup.
[1] - <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/boeing-737-global-supply-chain/" rel="nofollow">https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/boeing-737-global-supply...
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
somenameforme · · focus · HN ↗
Freedom2 · · focus · HN ↗
maxglute · · focus · HN ↗
This conflating US financializing manufacturing vs actual industrial capacity, i.e. the entire manufacturing by value / MVA "cope". US objectively doesn't make much relative to past and a lot of shit US makes, US doesn't actually make, others does the actual making while US financializes and capture via spreadsheet maxxing, hedonic adjustments etc, and do insert "I made this meme" on things US fundamentally did not "make"
Like US does make some legitimate frontier stuff in house - the reality is is in aggregate industrial base terms, US MAKES / FABRICATES very little vs pre industrial chain hollow out, US does import a lot of subcomponents that others make, integrates, or outsource actual MAKING abroad while capturing intangibles like IP/patent fees that get bundled up into value add stats, but when people talk about making they're talking about extraction to factory gate pipeline. Not US can sell a bunch of foreign made goods with some CONUS final assembly or IP accounting because muh smile curve that attributes disproportionate "value" to US "makers". Consider a US widget co imports $10 of components assembles and sells for $40, the statistically manufacturing value add is $30 even though US did very little making. Now add tariffs, regulatory capture etc and widget sells for $50 and that's $40 of MVA for basically doing minimal M. Said US widget factory makes 10 widgets and adds $400 to MVA. Meanwhile a PRC widget company makes 100 identical widgets at $2 each... but their MVA is only $200, but they did literally all the making. These two industrial bases are not the same. Then a few years later, US BLS/BEA applies a statistical adjustment because widget X is slightly more performant... (prevalent in tech), so that widget is now listed as $100 equivalent utility, so hey manufacturing expanded (it didn't).
SpaceX... doesn't make that much... they make a few thing that are reusable and due to techstack can lift a lot, i.e. operational improvement (not discounting how game changing resuable is). But compare to PRC, who made like 2x-3x more first stages, i.e. their output is significantly higher, which is to say SpaceX is "making" at about American scale. For reference Boeing like ~30% domestic content, US auto ~50%. Reality is the ONLY thing US is REALLY good at making is refined fossil, agri, wood products etc. Almost everything else US very good at making money, but not the stuff.
TLDR US got much better at MAKING money from other people MAKING things. The other caveat is regulatory capture = US grossly overpay for mediocre shit, a lot of stuff that makes in US are just... not good, i.e. vehicles, but people trapped paying domestic premium which inflates value add but not actual relevant when people discuss US making things. US broadly makes a lot of mediocre overpriced things while population stuck shopping in company store for large items, that looks good on value add / productivity stats... but it's not reflection of industrial capacity which is what people think about in terms of real manufacturing.
shimman · · focus · HN ↗
You literally are praising a system that condemned tens of millions of Americans to abject poverty because the rich wanted slightly better returns.
fragmede · · focus · HN ↗
Boeing builds their planes in America, F150s are largely built in Michigan, iPhones are manufactured in China, but California is much richer because of the taxes that Apple employees pay. Millions of Americans are in poverty according to the latest census, but I don't know how you establish cause for that poverty being "that rich people wanted higher returns".
wat10000 · · focus · HN ↗
Americans are better off than they've ever been. The improvement has disproportionately gone to the wealthy, but even the poorest have seen gains, not losses.
I don't understand this kind of comment. It's like some sort of disaster fantasy. Like you need it to be a crapsack world full of slums, so you come up with absurd takes like American companies employing huge number of Americans not contributing to American prosperity, and just make up troubles.
conmod278 · · focus · HN ↗
If there was no China, Globalization would spread very strongly with Bangladesh manufacturing clothes and Milan doing the fashion show. All those calculations are coming undone. So please keep this main reason front and center when we discuss this matters.
throw58876t · · focus · HN ↗
Even with how long Russia has been an antagonist, they are still seen as a “wayward brother.”
YinglingHeavy · · focus · HN ↗
The Vespa popularized by Hollywood's Roman Holiday propped up a post-War Italy.
Ping-Pong Diplomacy of the 70s gifted China its electronics manufacturing (think: PONG) turning it from a 3rd world backwater to what it is today. The exchange was in removing the 'Gang of Four' and the drugs associated with it.
---
The US was put into a privileged position as reserve currency of the WORLD in Bretton Woods. This is with the understanding/responsibility that the US would act as World Police and prop up foreign economies.
That is the system that is ending.
conmod278 · · focus · HN ↗
FuckButtons · · focus · HN ↗
hard_times · · focus · HN ↗
It just seems to me that fundamentally this is a knowledge organization problem.
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Tooling is a high-skill trade. America used to be amazing at tooling. What's more, tooling isn't super cost sensitive because one tool can make thousands of parts.
When outsourcing to China began the tools would be made in the USA and shipped to China for the low-skill work. But over time those Chinese manufacturers figured out the tooling. What's more they realized that controlling the tooling would let them control the whole process.
They started doing things like, for instance, including the tooling in the price of the product so you don't even see it, if you use their tools. Just send them the cad file and they'll do the rest. So American tool making went away. But this was a conscious decision on the part of the Chinese manufacturer and an unconscious decision on the part of American importers who didn't really value their in-house expertise.
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
I didn't miss it.
> The problem was that substantial subcomponent or process vendors only exist in china.
He found vendors in USA. They didn't call him back.
USA has manufacturing. But Americans want to drive cars and own their own home. In order to achieve that American manufacturers need high volume or high margin - better BBQ scrubber isn't either of those.
> What's more, tooling isn't super cost sensitive because one tool can make thousands of parts.
Tool making is highly sensitive to labor cost. Every article is a one-off. It can't be automated, often not even duplicated. There are tool and die makers in the USA but if you want to make consumer products you can't afford American tool and die because American tool and die makers want to drive cars and own their own homes. Chinese tool and die makers don't have the same expectations.
> So American tool making went away.
It didn't go away. You just don't know about it.
gedy · · focus · HN ↗
“Any idiot can run a business, but it takes an MBA to run a business that barely functions.”
hard_times · · focus · HN ↗
gedy · · focus · HN ↗
logancbrown · · focus · HN ↗
This is already showing not to be true with AI. Institutional knowledge is not the same as knowing how to implement low-level software details. Even today, every company does not need engineers to remember git cli syntax by memory, how to write parsers for JSON, or write the large amount of boilerplate from scratch that is at every software company. Most company's already hire engineers who have zero experience in the existing code base, yet they are productive despite this lack of institutional knowledge. For a company to maintain institutional knowledge they may only need N/K engineers.
oblio · · focus · HN ↗
hibikir · · focus · HN ↗
ecocentrik · · focus · HN ↗
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
Americans produce the highest technology equipment in the world. Our machining base is structurally sound, but its all making weapons, so you don't hear about it.
It's true that China benefitted immensely from outsourcing, but they took the jobs Americans didn't want. It's the same with immigration today - folks cross the Rio Grande to do chores that Americans won't, or others fly in and work for nothing in academia while they wait for their PhD.
> The problem imo is the slow deterioration of institutional knowledge that offloading the mental task of wisdom gathering to AI is causing.
Have you considered the institutional knowledge could actually be actively preserved and distributed with AI? The kind of tacit knowledge that is situated and not readily preserved in a book might be absorbed by thinking machines and proliferated to the next person who needs it. The caveats would be trade secrets, skill differentiators, that people might not be willing to discuss, and manufacturing secrets of national importance. Maybe you can think of others.
glenstein · · focus · HN ↗
Well that's what this whole debate comes down to. And, to my mind at least, it's a rare case of an actually interesting question about AI, because like the article says, it can plausibly deteriorate exactly that kind of knowledge. But as you note, it can also maintain it.
I think there's a sense in which it might do both at the same time. AI's version of on call tacit knowledge might be something like lazy-loading just-in-time tacit knowledge, but at the cost of who knows what cognitive paths we might have by keeping that knowledge resting in-house. We would gain real efficiency but we wouldn't know we wouldn't know.
>The kind of tacit knowledge that is situated and not readily preserved in a book might be absorbed by thinking machines and proliferated to the next person who needs it. The caveats would be trade secrets, skill differentiators, that people might not be willing to discuss, and manufacturing secrets of national importance. Maybe you can think of others.
It's funny that you credit AI with this (and I don't disagree), because tacit knowledge was exactly the thing Hubert Dreyfus spent a career insisting computers would never have, and his wisdom was taught to generations of undergraduates across the country and world who treated it as received wisdom and still is regarded as such in certain academic corners.
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
This is probably true.
Many artisan fabric techniques were lost when industrial looms displaced those jobs. But heavy industry enabled cloth to be manufactured at a rate that people were free to spend their time and money on other priorities - and now (centuries later) the society is in a sufficiently advanced stage of development that the old techniques are being rediscovered.
Perhaps the example underscores the importance of thoughtful preservation of insitutional knowledge.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
Could you elaborate on this? It sounds like something any anthropologist would laugh at; there's always an oral culture.
glenstein · · focus · HN ↗
When he described those limits, he always frustrated computer scientists and analytic philosophers because he spoke in a kind of informal philosophical vocabulary and didn't really formalize his ideas. So he would say computers didn't have things like "tacit knowledge" or "insight" and he railed against "symbol manipulation". Famously he declared chess would never surpass human expert play. He wrote a book called "What Computers Can't Do" and another called "What Computer's Still Can't Do".
I personally think his argument was laughably wrong if well intentioned. But some people think it was respectable. I think in the present day, he's often rehabilitated with a kind of apologetic reinterpretation, such that things like transformers, weights, vectors, etc were what he really meant all along.
I think he was not wrong that some higher layer of sophistication would prove to be necessary, but he was wrong, I think definitively, to think that "symbol manipulation" of computers was a kind of category error. Even today's best models are still running on logic gates over 1's and 0's, and it was his failure of imagination to doubt that those could be the conceptual bedrock for AI, tacit knowledge and all.
He passed away in 2017, which is too bad because I would have loved to have seen his interpretation of things like GPT-6 Astra.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
> think that "symbol manipulation" of computers was a kind of category error
This is where we do drift off into the semantic bog. If there is tacit knowledge in an LLM, then where is it? It must be in the weights, and it must have somehow come from the training data. Therefore the weights represent "compressed" knowledge. Is that then not "tacit" since it's explicitly encoded?
glenstein · · focus · HN ↗
I think what it comes down to, is trying to turn the specialness of human intelligence into undefinable magic, essentially playing god of the gaps with the concept of human insight. So by design, it has to be something that can't be amenable to any formal representation like weights.
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
He never made such a claim. In the introduction to the 1972 print of this book he discusses the forecasts from Turing to his time of computers' abilities to play chess and the then state of the art. He criticizes the early optimism in 1950s mentioning that in 1957 H. Simon though in 10 years computers would excel in chess.
Dreyfus goes on to discuss the history of forecasts and progress in computer chess in a nuanced and highly informative analysis.
Whatever your opinion of his work I don't think it's fair to say his arguments are "laughably wrong" at any turn. I haven't read his books in detail but from what I know he made great contributions to the dialogue about technology and I don't know any instance of his making crass predictions or anything that he wrote that could be labelled "laughable".
glenstein · · focus · HN ↗
He thought that the complexity of chess rendered it solvable in principle but "uncomputable" in practice. You're right that he was speaking to the times he was familiar with, and what he meant by "impossible in practice" was something like letting a 1Mhz computer explore all the possible chess moves from now until the heat death of the universe. Relying on that to insist that computers defeating humans in his lifetime was consistent with what he envisioned stretches past charitability and into sophistry.
And I don't think you can do that without also extending the same charity toward proponents of computer intelligence he was critiquing, and if you do that his thesis, which was disproportionately preoccupied with retelling the failures of the 1950s over and over again using them to represent the whole of computing while the world moved on, because the same charitable repairs extended the other way make AI into something less easily caricatured, and still based on the same logic gates and 0s and 1s he was criticizing.
If that's not enough, Dreyfus explicitly said that what was lacking in chess programs was (1) any practical ability to do the brute forcing needed, (2) any kind of nim-style logical shortcuts around brute forcing or (3) any kind of expert level heuristics because he categorically believed those simply weren't programmable. And he believed that those exhausted the options. [1]
There's no version of this that can be correct because even if you think he's right that chess engines got better by progressing to some different conceptual paradigm, that paradigm is still embodied in same logic gates and 1's and 0's that he thought only pertained to prior paradigms he was criticizing. He was wrong to assume such things as "heuristics" were out of that scope.
1. <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/42372/1/Martin%20and%20Williams%202025%20What%20ChatGP%20accepted%20version.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://repository.essex.ac.uk/42372/1/Martin%20and%20Willia...
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
I do object to calling his writing "laughable".
Thank you for the article, it seems quite interesting on skimming and I will save it for later.
matwood · · focus · HN ↗
It's also very automated so the jobs went away, but the US continues to manufactures a lot of things.
bluefirebrand · · focus · HN ↗
They took jobs that Americans would have wanted higher pay to do, higher benefits, higher safety standards...
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
jplusequalt · · focus · HN ↗
You don't develop "institutional knowledge" from a few prompts. It takes years to develop them.
engineer_22 · · focus · HN ↗
Is AI going somewhere?
glenstein · · focus · HN ↗
Right. And the spin I would put on your point: while the U.S. could never compete with outsourced labor, institutional manufacturing expertise could (you would think) still be valuable to startups finding some kind of niche in the manufacturing space.
With all this new 3D printing infrastructure, and constantly improving robotics, maybe some manufacturing efficiencies in some spaces could emerge that compete on cost and outcompete the cost of shipping stuff across an ocean. The availability of institutional expertise could be one of the necessary ingredients for mixing and matching the way to a new efficiency.
Yeah it's bleak in terms of automating away labor, but I'd like to think robotics is the next automated frontier after LLMs and we want to get there first.
aaron695 · · focus · HN ↗
[dead]
musha68k · · focus · HN ↗
At the very latest, when "AGI robots" will be commonplace and taking on the most crucial labour on our behalf.
6LLvveMx2koXfwn · · focus · HN ↗
I believe this is what Socrates said (verbatim) about the invention of writing.
howunfortunate · · focus · HN ↗
We have significantly degraded in our ability to memorize e.g. epic poems or preserve oral traditions since the advent of writing.
I know that sounds trite in retrospect, given the benefits, and that's half the point. But there are real tradeoffs too! For example, culture has a LOT more generation-to-generation turnover as a result of literacy being common, making it unstable.
6LLvveMx2koXfwn · · focus · HN ↗
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
The passage criticizing the "invention of writing" is a quote from a legend where a Pharaoh passes negative judgement to a god, by the way, who had invented writing in the story.
Ironically, the dialogue in question, Phaedrus, is about the dangers of misreading text. It discusses writing political speeches not writing per se.
[deleted] · · focus · HN ↗
[deleted]
fwlr · · focus · HN ↗
In the world where we didn’t outsource Western manufacturing to China, our homes would not be overflowing with disposable junk; in the world where the Luddites won, our wardrobes would not be stuffed full of disposable clothes; perhaps in the world where Socrates won our minds would not be jammed full of nonsense.
6LLvveMx2koXfwn · · focus · HN ↗
fwlr · · focus · HN ↗
ofjcihen · · focus · HN ↗
Having something else do all of that for you is completely different and essentially tossing any gain outside of the creation of some gray slurry of an output in the trash.
huurtehoog · · focus · HN ↗
Besides, the dialogue is not about writing itself, but about writing down political speeches and the consequences and impact of political speeches being read rather than heard.
Also, the dialogue dates from about three thousand years after writing was invented.
Some direct quotes from the dialogue:
SOCRATES: So, it is obvious to everyone that speech writing is not shameful, not in itself anyway (258d)
SOCRATES: We are left with the question of the appropriateness and inappropriateness of writing, and how it may be executed in a worthy or an inappropriate manner. Do you agree? (274b)
And this, a very relevant insight for an age when some are convinced that text analysis should suffice for intelligent work:
SOCRATES: Then a person who thinks he has left a skill in writing behind him, and anyone who, for his part, inherits this on the assumption that something clear and certain will emerge from writing, would be full of enormous silliness, and indeed ignorant of the prophetic words of Ammon in believing that written words are anything more than a reminder to a person who already knows whatever it is that the written words may refer to.
Ironically, the sharpest criticism Socrates made of writing in the often misread Phaedrus was of misreading texts.
WarmWash · · focus · HN ↗
To build a $100M software company, you need 6 engineers and 6 laptops.
To build a $100M hardware company, you need 60 engineers and $100M.
Everyone decided on the most logical choice. It gets even worse if you jump into profit margins, as software is the unambiguous winner there too.
hdgvhicv · · focus · HN ↗
maerF0x0 · · focus · HN ↗
gonzalohm · · focus · HN ↗
godshatter · · focus · HN ↗
I wish more people would at least consider this idea.
geodel · · focus · HN ↗
That's the whole point of Global managerial class even without AI. The idea is just by creating metrics one can measure how teams, groups, organization and whole industries are performing.
Before the current AI complex the previous one Agile Industry Complex One can see we starting producing 10x more code, 50x more JIRAs resolved, 100x more network bandwidth used. All these metrics tremendous gain in productivity.
Also it may not have been seen in US but in many places a change in political regime does want to burn down previously collected institutional knowledge because new dispensation have their own idea about what is knowledge, who will preserve it and how it will be preserved.
fl0id · · focus · HN ↗
epolanski · · focus · HN ↗
Bogus nonsense.
1. Manufacturing output in West/America is higher than it ever was in history.
2. What has reduced over time is the number of people employed in manufacturing, not manufacturing output. And that's an effect of automation, same as it happened over centuries in agriculture.
3. West/America did not decide anything, the realities of capitalism did.
You're either a capitalist and embrace efficiency of producing where it makes sense (for many different reasons) or you're fine with inefficient third-tier industries.
The tax payer may help a handful of sectors that would otherwise die survive if they are truly critical for national security, but just a handful, not all of them.
maerF0x0 · · focus · HN ↗
The resilience is more in ensuring archival process to ensure it's never lost forever, and a continuity plan to ensure enough (but few) people still know.
newyankee · · focus · HN ↗