The problem imo is the slow deterioration of institutional knowledge that offloading the mental task of wisdom gathering to AI is causing.
One interesting comparison is to the history of manufacturing. West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China. The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff (such as grill brush [1])
I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
"I'm coding 10x faster"
"look at the output velocity per employee"
"we are producing much more (in China)"
"look at profit / number of (manufacturing) employers"
Seems ok if you're American / Chinese but I'm struggling to understand how the rest can be OK with allowing institutional knowledge to deteriorate while having an active dependency to the former two. We already see this with the tech dependency towards USA and manufacturing competition from China.
> I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
There were all these theories like Comparative Advantage that people would trot out to point out that, if you don't like outsourcing, not only are you ignorant and backwards you're also probably racist.
I specifically remember seeing the ricardian tables, featuring 8th grade math proving how competitive advantage means everyone wins. This was very persuasive to me as a college sophomore, all my professors were on board and I was young.
I remember being a young guy, blue collar background, but in the left-wing anti-globalization movement (think Seattle WTO protester types).
When I was in college or going to parties with New Yorker Reader types I'd try to argue against globalization and they would start smugly dropping their theories on me. I was too young and naive to refute them in any kind of convincing way, but my life experience told me that it was wrong.
But it was pervasive in the zeitgeist. Basically anyone trying to argue against it was backwards and stupid, or shrill if they were lefty.
I wonder if the exact date of anti-globalization switching from being a "left populism" to "right populism" thing could be determined.
However I'm not sure it could really be stopped or whether it was inevitable from containerization. Can you really prevent people from getting cheaper products forever?
Again containerization happened in the 1970s and 1980s. The China Shock was 2000-2010.
What technology was invented in 2000 that allowed everything to go to China? No technology. That was the year the US adopted Permanent Normalized Trade Relations with China. It was a government policy change!
By the way the US already had trade relations with China. All PNTR did was promise not to change the policy in the future. That was the starting gun that signaled to all American companies that they should start investing in production in China.
So would globalization happen on some scale just because of the march of technology? Sure. But the way it happened, the speed at which it happened and the extent to which it happened, were the result of policy choices.
I'm pretty sure that China demonstrating that they are a stable country, that they want foreign investment, that they won't gank your investment two weeks after you make it, and that they aren't going to do another Great Leap Forward may have had something to do with why foreign investment in it skyrocketed.
This sort of thing takes time, and by the 00s, enough time (and a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation) passed, and foreign investors were gaining confidence.
The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week.
> a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation
No, but there definitely was a much slower gradual repression over a longer period, with a final round of protest repression: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_protests" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_pr...
> The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week
Amen. A two-pole model is simple and attractive but the rest of the world is also, you know, doing stuff and buying things. America can, for example, preserve its car industry by refusing to allow Chinese EVs, but will gradually discover it has become uncompetitive overseas.
NalNezumi · · focus · HN ↗
One interesting comparison is to the history of manufacturing. West/America decided one day that manufacturing would be cheaper to outsource and better (short term) profit was to be made by outsourcing it all to China. The institutional expertise started to deteriorate, to the point that America simply didn't even have the capacity, or expertise anymore to produce stuff (such as grill brush [1])
I feel like you could take all the handwavy comment that are made today to dismiss this caution, and find equal dismissal back then when companies were actively outsourcing the manufacturing.
"I'm coding 10x faster" "look at the output velocity per employee"
"we are producing much more (in China)" "look at profit / number of (manufacturing) employers"
Seems ok if you're American / Chinese but I'm struggling to understand how the rest can be OK with allowing institutional knowledge to deteriorate while having an active dependency to the former two. We already see this with the tech dependency towards USA and manufacturing competition from China.
[1] <a href="https://youtu.be/3ZTGwcHQfLY" rel="nofollow">https://youtu.be/3ZTGwcHQfLY
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
Absolutely people were extremely dismissive to anyone saying that we're losing the ability to make things in this country!
There were all these theories like Comparative Advantage that people would trot out to point out that, if you don't like outsourcing, not only are you ignorant and backwards you're also probably racist.
nixon_why69 · · focus · HN ↗
I guess we were all lacking wisdom.
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
When I was in college or going to parties with New Yorker Reader types I'd try to argue against globalization and they would start smugly dropping their theories on me. I was too young and naive to refute them in any kind of convincing way, but my life experience told me that it was wrong.
But it was pervasive in the zeitgeist. Basically anyone trying to argue against it was backwards and stupid, or shrill if they were lefty.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
However I'm not sure it could really be stopped or whether it was inevitable from containerization. Can you really prevent people from getting cheaper products forever?
jordanb · · focus · HN ↗
What technology was invented in 2000 that allowed everything to go to China? No technology. That was the year the US adopted Permanent Normalized Trade Relations with China. It was a government policy change!
By the way the US already had trade relations with China. All PNTR did was promise not to change the policy in the future. That was the starting gun that signaled to all American companies that they should start investing in production in China.
So would globalization happen on some scale just because of the march of technology? Sure. But the way it happened, the speed at which it happened and the extent to which it happened, were the result of policy choices.
vkou · · focus · HN ↗
This sort of thing takes time, and by the 00s, enough time (and a recent Hong Kong transfer that did not result in mass liquidation) passed, and foreign investors were gaining confidence.
The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week.
pjc50 · · focus · HN ↗
No, but there definitely was a much slower gradual repression over a longer period, with a final round of protest repression: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_protests" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_pr...
> The world, and especially China has agency of its own, it isn't sorely driven by whatever American policy is it's flavour of the week
Amen. A two-pole model is simple and attractive but the rest of the world is also, you know, doing stuff and buying things. America can, for example, preserve its car industry by refusing to allow Chinese EVs, but will gradually discover it has become uncompetitive overseas.