Wars are expensive, and the money has to come from somewhere:
> Lots of countries — including Egypt (the Nile/wider Red Sea supremacy), Eritrea (Ethiopia’s desire for access to the sea), Sudan (Ethiopian support for the RSF), Somalia (historical enmity/Ethiopian support for Somaliland), and Saudi Arabia (as benefactor of Egypt/Sudan/Eritrea axis) — have good reasons to keep Addis Ababa weak and preoccupied with unending domestic wars. These dynamics, coupled with the geography of war in Ethiopia mean that Addis Ababa will struggle to keep arms and fighters from easily moving across its borders with Sudan and Eritrea.
> On its part, the Ethiopian state will likely continue to enjoy support from the United Arab Emirates; and maintain the capacity to produce the weapons needed to keep rebels at bay. Ominously, divisions among elites in Tigray and other regions mean that the rebellion may not clear the threshold needed to incentivize a quick resolution either militarily or at the negotiating table. Therefore, slow-burning, but still catastrophically deadly conflicts may be on the cards.
> …
> Notably, a prolonged conflict will likely also be significantly civilianized. Careful to avoid being overstretched, the Ethiopian state may decide to deputize regional militias and other violence entrepreneurs in its fights against subnational armed groups. To this end, it will lean heavily on divisions across armed groups and within the regional states that have witnessed rebellions.
Part of a unifying the nation will be convincing these players that they will do better with a peaceful, stable Ethiopia.
jt2190 · · focus · HN ↗
> Lots of countries — including Egypt (the Nile/wider Red Sea supremacy), Eritrea (Ethiopia’s desire for access to the sea), Sudan (Ethiopian support for the RSF), Somalia (historical enmity/Ethiopian support for Somaliland), and Saudi Arabia (as benefactor of Egypt/Sudan/Eritrea axis) — have good reasons to keep Addis Ababa weak and preoccupied with unending domestic wars. These dynamics, coupled with the geography of war in Ethiopia mean that Addis Ababa will struggle to keep arms and fighters from easily moving across its borders with Sudan and Eritrea.
> On its part, the Ethiopian state will likely continue to enjoy support from the United Arab Emirates; and maintain the capacity to produce the weapons needed to keep rebels at bay. Ominously, divisions among elites in Tigray and other regions mean that the rebellion may not clear the threshold needed to incentivize a quick resolution either militarily or at the negotiating table. Therefore, slow-burning, but still catastrophically deadly conflicts may be on the cards.
> …
> Notably, a prolonged conflict will likely also be significantly civilianized. Careful to avoid being overstretched, the Ethiopian state may decide to deputize regional militias and other violence entrepreneurs in its fights against subnational armed groups. To this end, it will lean heavily on divisions across armed groups and within the regional states that have witnessed rebellions.
Part of a unifying the nation will be convincing these players that they will do better with a peaceful, stable Ethiopia.