Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Linux kernel
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Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Linux kernel
Unofficial Hacker News client; not affiliated with Y Combinator.
john_strinlai · · focus · HN ↗
>“Due to the layer at which the Linux kernel is in a system, almost any bug might be exploitable to compromise the security of the kernel… Because of this, the CVE assignment team is overly cautious and assign CVE numbers to any bugfix that they identify.”
<a href="https://docs.kernel.org/process/cve.html" rel="nofollow">https://docs.kernel.org/process/cve.html
"number of cves" is a useless metric, especially when it comes to the kernel.
mbreese · · focus · HN ↗
I do find it interesting though, that in the interest of transparency, every bugfix gets a CVE. Which ends up being a huge number… which will ultimately yield a more insecure environment as we’re getting conditioned to ignore/discount CVEs by the volume.
Over-reporting in this case seems to risk being counterproductive.
Gigachad · · focus · HN ↗
The frequency and severity of cyber attacks has increased to the point a much more cautious approach has become common. It's also easier to sell this work to management when you can point at the security tab on some tool and say "Look we need to patch these CVEs"
autoexec · · focus · HN ↗
Gigachad · · focus · HN ↗
1718627440 · · focus · HN ↗
Gigachad · · focus · HN ↗
1718627440 · · focus · HN ↗
seb1204 · · focus · HN ↗
fwip · · focus · HN ↗
This isn't necessarily true, and will be less true in the coming age of LLM-automated vulnerability scanning. The version that you're downloading (after being nagged for a day) that adds Feature A may contain 3 vulnerabilities that are already known before you even download the update, and may or may not fix old vulnerabilities.
izacus · · focus · HN ↗
cesarb · · focus · HN ↗
> [...] a much more cautious approach has become common.
I'd argue that this is a less cautious approach, not more. It takes time to carefully evaluate, review, and test each change.
socializer · · focus · HN ↗
Kernel development is well-funded, both via grants and by direct employment at big tech companies, and if they wanted to properly triage and annotate vulnerabilities, and provide reasonable assessments of what is or isn't likely to be a security risk, they absolutely could. They almost certainly could go to Google and say "we need two people full-time on your payroll for this" and they would get it.
I don't want to dunk on them too much because they're generally doing God's work, but these absolutist security stances are not worth being taken seriously.
It's basically saying that they can't possibly provide a valuable service for 99.999% of the install base because there might a hypothetical person out there using Linux in a really weird way. If Microsoft tried to make an argument like that, they'd get crucified.
vlovich123 · · focus · HN ↗
seb1204 · · focus · HN ↗
cannonpalms · · focus · HN ↗
asdfaoeu · · focus · HN ↗
serbuvlad · · focus · HN ↗
Linux only ever wanted to promise support for the latest release and even Linux LTS is a concession.
And CVEs are basically a useless concept if you roll. (or at least not any more useful than any other bug tracker which supports tags)
LtWorf · · focus · HN ↗
If he kept true of his "we don't break user space" instead of it being "we don't break user space until we do and then it's on you to deal with it" perhaps more people would be willing to run the latest release.
serbuvlad · · focus · HN ↗
Linux LTS is much more about proprietary drivers targeting a stable internal kernel API/ABI than about anything else.
LtWorf · · focus · HN ↗
mwwaters · · focus · HN ↗
Internal Kernel API changes all the time which can break proprietary drivers. But userspace API has a far higher guarantee.
LtWorf · · focus · HN ↗
doublepg23 · · focus · HN ↗
throwaway7356 · · focus · HN ↗
LtWorf · · focus · HN ↗
DSMan195276 · · focus · HN ↗
I'll challenge this, I don't think that's really possible, at least not to any high degree of confidence. Nobody can realistically evaluate if any particular out-of-bounds read/write or use-after-free is "safe", and if you're going to consider all of those as security risks then there's not really a point in trying to filter out the few bug fixes that might not lead to those things.
Try going to the linked page, pick any random CVE, and read it. I've checked a bunch and I'd say _at least_ 8/10 of them are variations on those two things.
someonebaggy · · focus · HN ↗
weinzierl · · focus · HN ↗
I would argue that it is more productive for the enduser as well. Not making a decision they cannot reasonably make is better then blindly believing in a decision that is likely wrong for your usecase.