We got asked this question two weeks ago when we conducted a workshop on effective and responsible use of AI tools at a local conference. But how can you argue about about IP and copyright if the breakthrough of LLMs is potentially based on circumventing or breaking IP and copyright in the first place?
It's no different than humans taking inspiration from IP and copyrighted works in their own creative endeavors. Imagine if programmers were unable to learn from open source. Or artists were unable to mimic styles and storylines. Musicians can't riff on things that others created.
It is different. The scale makes it different. It's different when it is all copyrighted works and IP. It's different when you solve Navier-Stokes by taking "inspiration" from a researcher's private work.
If it's "learning" is to be seen in the same context as a human, then the punishment/ repercussion for hacking and causing real harm should also be similar to what a human might recieve.
It cannot opportunistically morph between a human for benefits and a machine for liability.
> It cannot opportunistically morph between a human for benefits and a machine for liability.
Indeed. Though here it would be morphing between human and machine even just for pure liability, which is even worse.
We have no way to tell if a machine has an experience (in general and not only) when being positively or negatively rewarded for what it produces; even if we assume it does, we have no way to tell if punishments are experienced like mild scolding (and rewards like mild praise), or if the punishments feel like being burned to death at the stake (while rewards feel like a religious experience combined with an orgasm).
We are just beginning to scratch the surface of what these kinds of question even look like in mechanistic terms; all philosophical discussions before it about p-zombies and the Chinese room and so on, they are all no more useful than any other non-expert armchair experts discussing things.
Even the current research, such as it is, is probably only at the level analogous to humoral theory when we want something at the level of germ theory.
Given my opening was agreeing with you, I ought to draw your attention: the part you seem to be replying to here is focused on the case where we really do want to know if we should treat the AI as we treat humans, and if so what punishing it looks like, rather than as property where we punish the owner.
> If a dog bites, we don't wait to take action until we figure out a way of teaching the dog the experience of guilt or punishment.
When we invented the concept of legal liability, our species was broadly still animistic and panpsychic. The concept of a "scapegoat" is named after the idea of literally putting the sins of a village into a goat and driving it away.
After doing that for perhaps 4500 years, we are now in the position to do as you say for e.g. dogs (and also machines).
What's the difference between getting a speeding ticket from a cop using a radar gun, and hundreds/thousands of automatically issued tickets from a combined radar/ALPR?
prathje · · focus · HN ↗
We got asked this question two weeks ago when we conducted a workshop on effective and responsible use of AI tools at a local conference. But how can you argue about about IP and copyright if the breakthrough of LLMs is potentially based on circumventing or breaking IP and copyright in the first place?
How do you feel about all of this?
bko · · focus · HN ↗
snarfy · · focus · HN ↗
devsda · · focus · HN ↗
It cannot opportunistically morph between a human for benefits and a machine for liability.
ben_w · · focus · HN ↗
Indeed. Though here it would be morphing between human and machine even just for pure liability, which is even worse.
We have no way to tell if a machine has an experience (in general and not only) when being positively or negatively rewarded for what it produces; even if we assume it does, we have no way to tell if punishments are experienced like mild scolding (and rewards like mild praise), or if the punishments feel like being burned to death at the stake (while rewards feel like a religious experience combined with an orgasm).
We are just beginning to scratch the surface of what these kinds of question even look like in mechanistic terms; all philosophical discussions before it about p-zombies and the Chinese room and so on, they are all no more useful than any other non-expert armchair experts discussing things.
Even the current research, such as it is, is probably only at the level analogous to humoral theory when we want something at the level of germ theory.
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humorism" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humorism
devsda · · focus · HN ↗
The liability lies with the owner and the punishment(monetary or other) should strongly incentivize the owner to reduce the incidence of bites.
ben_w · · focus · HN ↗
> If a dog bites, we don't wait to take action until we figure out a way of teaching the dog the experience of guilt or punishment.
When we invented the concept of legal liability, our species was broadly still animistic and panpsychic. The concept of a "scapegoat" is named after the idea of literally putting the sins of a village into a goat and driving it away.
After doing that for perhaps 4500 years, we are now in the position to do as you say for e.g. dogs (and also machines).
hydrogen7800 · · focus · HN ↗