When exactly did we forget how to make literally anything that can perform a computation but (physically, hardware-level) not have the ability connect to the Internet?
With these companies spending the kind of money they are, if they actually mean what they say about the security risks, they should be expected to figure out those kinds of precautions and take them.
And build Faraday cages too, just in case of a hardware supply chain compromise.
That's why all of this marketing about agents going rogue is so unbelievable. The only way for a tool to escape a sandbox is if you built a crappy sandbox, and after this length of time I literally don't believe that they can't do it
This kind of sandboxing is not complex to do, especially for a company with OpenAI money. If you want your tools to explore hacking, you restrict them from internet access except for a whitelist of sites that have either opted-in, or you've very carefully vetted to make sure you won't cause any problems to. Its also not difficult to restrict their ability to make calls to be simulated, or to use fake tools that can only run the real commands if they're being run against the correct target
This is all incredibly basic security stuff to make sure you don't accidentally cause someone problems, and I simply don't believe these AI companies anymore. Its either intentional, or gross negligence
Two things can be true. Yes this appears to be negligence on the part of OpenAI.
However, making a secure 'sandbox' is quite hard. There's a huge variety of exploits that exist today, including many we don't know about. Strong models have already shown a capability of finding and using such bugs.
Even one of the strongest boxes we can imagine, literally just a text interface a human can read, has been repeatedly shown to allow unfriendly AI to escape containment: <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/w/ai-boxing-containment" rel="nofollow">https://www.lesswrong.com/w/ai-boxing-containment
Protecting against an AI convincing the human to let it out of the box is an interesting challenge. Even a dual-keyed system to do so only requires convincing two people, although I suppose more elaborate containment mechanisms can be devised. N-keys is democracy and that doesn't seem immune.
Two random thoughts:
* This box we want to keep AIs in reminds me a bit of the story of Pandora's box
* I'm also reminded of the original alignment problem in Genesis 3 where one creature convinces another to take an unaligned action.
Containment is a pretty fundamental tricky security problem actually once persuasion is part of the threat model.
zahlman · · focus · HN ↗
With these companies spending the kind of money they are, if they actually mean what they say about the security risks, they should be expected to figure out those kinds of precautions and take them.
And build Faraday cages too, just in case of a hardware supply chain compromise.
20k · · focus · HN ↗
This kind of sandboxing is not complex to do, especially for a company with OpenAI money. If you want your tools to explore hacking, you restrict them from internet access except for a whitelist of sites that have either opted-in, or you've very carefully vetted to make sure you won't cause any problems to. Its also not difficult to restrict their ability to make calls to be simulated, or to use fake tools that can only run the real commands if they're being run against the correct target
This is all incredibly basic security stuff to make sure you don't accidentally cause someone problems, and I simply don't believe these AI companies anymore. Its either intentional, or gross negligence
ball_of_lint · · focus · HN ↗
However, making a secure 'sandbox' is quite hard. There's a huge variety of exploits that exist today, including many we don't know about. Strong models have already shown a capability of finding and using such bugs.
Even one of the strongest boxes we can imagine, literally just a text interface a human can read, has been repeatedly shown to allow unfriendly AI to escape containment: <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/w/ai-boxing-containment" rel="nofollow">https://www.lesswrong.com/w/ai-boxing-containment
gregw2 · · focus · HN ↗
Protecting against an AI convincing the human to let it out of the box is an interesting challenge. Even a dual-keyed system to do so only requires convincing two people, although I suppose more elaborate containment mechanisms can be devised. N-keys is democracy and that doesn't seem immune.
Two random thoughts:
* This box we want to keep AIs in reminds me a bit of the story of Pandora's box
* I'm also reminded of the original alignment problem in Genesis 3 where one creature convinces another to take an unaligned action.
Containment is a pretty fundamental tricky security problem actually once persuasion is part of the threat model.