Thread

1. ApolloFortyNine · 1790356118 · focus · HN ↗

   I know everyone says this is political but it actually seems like a textbook designation. Anthropic wanted to have rules on how the military used AI, the military said no and therefore doesn't want anthropic used anywhere in their supply line.

   This is like a pen manufacturer not wanting their pens used to sign drone strike orders, now the military needs to have a special box of pens that don't have stipulations attached. With AI usage it would be the same thing except applied to entire product chains. It seems like it would just add more complexity to operations.

   You can agree with the rules anthropic wanted, but having rules set by a private company at all that apply to the military does seem fair for the military to object to.

   >The Department reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude’s design to prevent it from performing national-security functions that the Department deems contractually authorized and necessary

   Though they'd probably put the DoD on the cybersecurity whitelist today, the very idea of the claude whitelists for certain functionality already exists and is being used by them today.

   1. sippingabonedry · 1790358153 · focus · HN ↗

      > I know everyone says this is political but it actually seems like a textbook designation

      It literally is a textbook definition, signed into US law:

      “Supply chain risk,” means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system (see 10 U.S.C. 3252).

      To add onto what another commenter said, the pen analogy would be more like the manufacturer designing pens that stopped working when used to sign strike orders they disagreed with.

      1. 7e · 1790361670 · focus · HN ↗

         It is not the textbook definition, because what Anthropic is doing is not sabotage, malicious, or subversive. Those are the key words in the definition. They are just refusing to add a feature to the military's specification. So their bid falls short of requirements.

         1. pas · 1790369589 · focus · HN ↗

            just because someone copied one sentence from some online reference it doesn't mean that the court used it for arguing their decision.

            <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;media.cadc.uscourts.gov&#x2F;opinions&#x2F;docs&#x2F;2026&#x2F;09&#x2F;26-1049-2194984.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;media.cadc.uscourts.gov&#x2F;opinions&#x2F;docs&#x2F;2026&#x2F;09&#x2F;26-104...

            &gt; Whatever paradigmatic examples individual members of Congress may have had in mind, the statutory definition is not limited to “adversar[ies],” 10 U.S.C. § 3252(d)(4), and instead covers “any person,”

            1. kelnos · 1790373042 · focus · HN ↗

               You&#x27;re not addressing the argument, though. No one is saying that the target must be an &quot;adversary&quot;.

               Anthropic&#x27;s actions were not sabotage, malicious, or subversive. That seems to be a requirement of the definition.

               1. pas · 1790375484 · focus · HN ↗

                  I tried to hint in my comment that the argument is completely different. the supply chain risk is just what the media runs with. (yes, it&#x27;s in the opinion, but that is the weaker part. and the court agrees, that it basically does not apply to Anthropic.)

                  there&#x27;s section 4713 which is roughly &quot;Secretary of War can pull the nat.sec. card, bye&quot;

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