Going directly for the logprobs is always icky when you use a chat model as base, because they are trained to write prose as output. So your "choice" tokens and thus their probabilities might get diluted in whatever else it wanted to say. If you have to do it in the same way as this post, at least add clear system instructions and a carefully worded beginning to the assistant output section of the prompt to lower the chances of it wandering off immediately.
I've found that using structured outputs solves this problem much better. Instead of letting a model generate only "A", "B" or "C" and looking at the probs, have it directly generate "Legitimate", "Spam" or "Phishing" or any other pre-defined option from a set of multi-token sequences. Behind the scenes it boils down to something quite similar, but you're not running into the risk that the model actually wanted to say "A phishing attempt seems likely, so answer (C) is correct.", which would lead "A" to have the highest probability in the first token. You can even use a reasoning budget this way either via inherent reasoning or a free-form part preceding the remaining output structure. You can also have it assign probabilities (either in words or numbers) using more complex output structures, but I would not rely on them much more than the token logprobs (they can still be quite good though).
The whole point is the quantified output. If you just ask an LLM to type out its confidence "manually", it'll make up some nonsense. The logprob numbers are more reliable.
I got this technique to work extremely reliably last year. However there were a bunch of caveats:
1) Firstly, you must institute a check that the multiple choice tokens dominate the output distribution. They should sum to 95% or more, ideally 99%, or the LLM is not following instructions properly. This is also the problem with constrained decoding - if the LLM really doesn't want to output a valid answer, the one you extract will not be high quality.
2) You need to ask it multiple times, permuting which option corresponds to which letter, and average the results. LLMs are surprisingly biased towards picking "A", especially if they're otherwise not sure.
3) For the same reason, performance improves if you frame the prompt as if it were the middle of a quiz. "Question 1" carries baggage that "Question 12" doesn't.
4) You must be exceedingly careful with tokenization.
But when all was said and done, I got a general purpose A/B classifier that gave high resolution quantitative output for the cost of a couple dozen tokens ingested and a couple inference passes.
> LLMs are surprisingly biased towards picking "A"
GP pointed at a causal explanation for this: almost every sentence in English that's a statement will start with "A" or "An", so "biased towards picking ''A''" will include most attempts at saying anything long-form for any reason.
I don't think that's the source of the bias I saw. I am confident that my prompting strategy eliminated attempts to generate long form content - specifically, I took care to wrap (A) and (B) in parentheses, so the completion looked like "Answer: (" - with this scheme an LLM is very unlikely to want to write "Answer: (A sentence goes here...". I know this, quantitatively, because I reliably got 99% distribution coverage with only A+B - that is, no inclination to write "The" or other common sentence starter. That's the beauty of the scheme - you can pretty directly and quantitatively validate how well the LLM understood the instructions. You expect it to only output A or B - so does it?
Meanwhile, the bias could be as much as 70% in favor of A in ambiguous cases - a signal completely drowning the <1% inclination to violate the format.
sigmoid10 · · focus · HN ↗
I've found that using structured outputs solves this problem much better. Instead of letting a model generate only "A", "B" or "C" and looking at the probs, have it directly generate "Legitimate", "Spam" or "Phishing" or any other pre-defined option from a set of multi-token sequences. Behind the scenes it boils down to something quite similar, but you're not running into the risk that the model actually wanted to say "A phishing attempt seems likely, so answer (C) is correct.", which would lead "A" to have the highest probability in the first token. You can even use a reasoning budget this way either via inherent reasoning or a free-form part preceding the remaining output structure. You can also have it assign probabilities (either in words or numbers) using more complex output structures, but I would not rely on them much more than the token logprobs (they can still be quite good though).
dTal · · focus · HN ↗
I got this technique to work extremely reliably last year. However there were a bunch of caveats: 1) Firstly, you must institute a check that the multiple choice tokens dominate the output distribution. They should sum to 95% or more, ideally 99%, or the LLM is not following instructions properly. This is also the problem with constrained decoding - if the LLM really doesn't want to output a valid answer, the one you extract will not be high quality. 2) You need to ask it multiple times, permuting which option corresponds to which letter, and average the results. LLMs are surprisingly biased towards picking "A", especially if they're otherwise not sure. 3) For the same reason, performance improves if you frame the prompt as if it were the middle of a quiz. "Question 1" carries baggage that "Question 12" doesn't. 4) You must be exceedingly careful with tokenization.
But when all was said and done, I got a general purpose A/B classifier that gave high resolution quantitative output for the cost of a couple dozen tokens ingested and a couple inference passes.
TeMPOraL · · focus · HN ↗
GP pointed at a causal explanation for this: almost every sentence in English that's a statement will start with "A" or "An", so "biased towards picking ''A''" will include most attempts at saying anything long-form for any reason.
dTal · · focus · HN ↗
Meanwhile, the bias could be as much as 70% in favor of A in ambiguous cases - a signal completely drowning the <1% inclination to violate the format.