So two hops, basically. First hop sees your IP address but not the website you're going to, second hop sees website but not IP address. Similar to Private Relay: <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602" rel="nofollow">https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602.
They don't even need to. If you observe enough of them you can correlate traffic patterns between them and find out which one is used by which endpoint
> Very true, but if even 1 of (Obscura, Mullvad) is honest
Just Obscura's compromise is enough, as pointed out previously: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43016574">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43016574
Unless something has changed in Obscura's architecture, the interface with Mullvad is under Obscura's control, and thus it can compromise client's credentials. This is unlike iCloud Private Relay where the guarantees are cryptographic in nature and not merely based on promises.
skaul · · focus · HN ↗
mulmen · · focus · HN ↗
PunchyHamster · · focus · HN ↗
dongcarl · · focus · HN ↗
Very true, but if even 1 of (Obscura, Mullvad) is honest, there's no de-anonymization.
For traditional Single-Party VPNs, you just need to compromise 1 party, with Two-Party Relays, you need to compromise both.
[deleted] · · focus · HN ↗
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ignoramous · · focus · HN ↗
Just Obscura's compromise is enough, as pointed out previously: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43016574">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43016574
Unless something has changed in Obscura's architecture, the interface with Mullvad is under Obscura's control, and thus it can compromise client's credentials. This is unlike iCloud Private Relay where the guarantees are cryptographic in nature and not merely based on promises.