Could someone explain to me what the general workflow is now that people are converging to? I haven't really been catching up with the AI ecosystem but I was looking into agent sandboxes and VM's recently and there's a ton of these startups and tools now. Is giving the agent a temporary scratchbox really that valuable?
I've been still just like, making VM's with proxmox, then putting my agent in the machine and letting it run free (with my dotfiles setup script making dev env pretty much free, though I could also just make a VM snapshot). What's wrong with that? Is that not the scalable solution for enterprise rn?
Basically everyone has a sandbox of some sort to run agents inside. Everyone has a registry of some sort for tools. Everyone has a way of running agents inside a sandbox and giving it some tools.
Now the stuff people are coming up with is: how do you do authorization in this model? do you need a full sandbox all the time or can it be a workflow? how do you specify an agent is it a prompt or does it have some kind of control flow structure? How do you coordinate among many running agents?
I would say thats where we are now is there’s loads of people all solving the same problems a bit like when CoreOS, Kube etc. were all competing.
Note you don't need a sandbox if you are not doing code execution. There are a lot of applications where inference only is sufficient e.g. web scraping websites that don't change frequently or OCR on scanned documents.
Code execution (usually TS/JS or Python) is useful most when you are dealing with truly open ended problems. It's the opposite of the use cases of most enterprise SaaS.
Do you actually need it, or do you just fear you need it?
What's the actual realistic threat model for median developer or median user here?
By realistic, I mean that leaking your grandma's recipes or your SSN or your million dollar idea to some pastebin is neither likely nor going to meaningfully make things worse for you, or be useful for any malicious actor. Surely this is not what everyone is worried about?
I spent today doing forensics on ten compromised WordPress sites sharing one hosting account.
I used two agents: One with network access to collect the evidence, and one with everything except the model endpoint cut off, which did the analysis.
The second agent's entire input was attacker-authored. So PHP droppers, obfuscated loaders, database rows, filenames, blah blah.
In this case I'm more worried about hostile input attacking the agent, and I need to contain the damage. My sandboxing solution does that by restricting access to the source data, making it read-only. The work dir can only transfer data via patch and apply (like a git workflow), so even my workspace can't be modified until I approve each change. And then restricted network means that any compromise ain't going noplace.
The second agent couldn't even install PHP or contact any CVE site to check if it was looking at a known attack, and that was by design. All it could do is write up a report about what it observed, not make assumptions about what it is. I could then take its (much smaller) clean output and pass that to a third agent with network access.
This is forensic work, so of course not your median dev's bread & butter. But the attack surface is only just starting to be plumbed. Compromising input can turn your agent into their agent, planting things as easily as planting worms was back in the early internet days when people connected without a firewall.
sigbottle · · focus · HN ↗
I've been still just like, making VM's with proxmox, then putting my agent in the machine and letting it run free (with my dotfiles setup script making dev env pretty much free, though I could also just make a VM snapshot). What's wrong with that? Is that not the scalable solution for enterprise rn?
faizshah · · focus · HN ↗
Now the stuff people are coming up with is: how do you do authorization in this model? do you need a full sandbox all the time or can it be a workflow? how do you specify an agent is it a prompt or does it have some kind of control flow structure? How do you coordinate among many running agents?
I would say thats where we are now is there’s loads of people all solving the same problems a bit like when CoreOS, Kube etc. were all competing.
Onavo · · focus · HN ↗
Code execution (usually TS/JS or Python) is useful most when you are dealing with truly open ended problems. It's the opposite of the use cases of most enterprise SaaS.
IanCal · · focus · HN ↗
TeMPOraL · · focus · HN ↗
What's the actual realistic threat model for median developer or median user here?
By realistic, I mean that leaking your grandma's recipes or your SSN or your million dollar idea to some pastebin is neither likely nor going to meaningfully make things worse for you, or be useful for any malicious actor. Surely this is not what everyone is worried about?
kstenerud · · focus · HN ↗
I used two agents: One with network access to collect the evidence, and one with everything except the model endpoint cut off, which did the analysis.
The second agent's entire input was attacker-authored. So PHP droppers, obfuscated loaders, database rows, filenames, blah blah.
In this case I'm more worried about hostile input attacking the agent, and I need to contain the damage. My sandboxing solution does that by restricting access to the source data, making it read-only. The work dir can only transfer data via patch and apply (like a git workflow), so even my workspace can't be modified until I approve each change. And then restricted network means that any compromise ain't going noplace.
The second agent couldn't even install PHP or contact any CVE site to check if it was looking at a known attack, and that was by design. All it could do is write up a report about what it observed, not make assumptions about what it is. I could then take its (much smaller) clean output and pass that to a third agent with network access.
This is forensic work, so of course not your median dev's bread & butter. But the attack surface is only just starting to be plumbed. Compromising input can turn your agent into their agent, planting things as easily as planting worms was back in the early internet days when people connected without a firewall.