Android 17 is the first since 3.x to add new APIs without releasing to the AOSP
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Android 17 is the first since 3.x to add new APIs without releasing to the AOSP
Unofficial Hacker News client; not affiliated with Y Combinator.
ahmd-sh · · focus · HN ↗
Graphene is reaching that status for me every day and i'm looking forward to switching to it as my daily driver.
kenhwang · · focus · HN ↗
subscribed · · focus · HN ↗
Anyone is free to fork, add the desired hardware support and flash.
(that's aside of some Moto flagships in 2027)
tcfhgj · · focus · HN ↗
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You say they can. How?
tredre3 · · focus · HN ↗
This is a real threat, but the reality is that the average person is more likely to be hacked/spied on from the software side, which Graphene would protect you from as effectively as it does on Pixel.
subscribed · · focus · HN ↗
:)
Well, go for it, fork and "provide support" to the hardware hostile to non-stock OS, be a hero :)
tcfhgj · · focus · HN ↗
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The rest is not (might be lazy, insecure or just silly but not hostile)
It's surprising some vendors still don't support unlocking and/or relocking.
tcfhgj · · focus · HN ↗
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Delayed patches (they don't keep up with AOSP), missing secure element (makes disk encryption key cracking trivial in comparison).
Fairphone 6/6+ (the latest), is based on..... It's pretty hard to find the Android version it's based on... Got it. They ship phones based on Android 16 half of the year after the release of 17 (9 since public beta).
Many security patches are NOT backported to 16, which makes Fairphone insecure by design.
They allow relocking the bootloader, which is nice, If they also support custom AVB keys, I'd say this is a fine example of the example of the vendor that is not hostile, just not good enough.
I wouldn't say they're hostile - Samsung is hostile for example.
So, what's your angle here? Do you want me to go through every vendor you bring up or what?
tcfhgj · · focus · HN ↗
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tcfhgj · · focus · HN ↗
> Well, go for it, fork and "provide support" to the hardware hostile to non-stock OS, be a hero :)
subscribed · · focus · HN ↗
In the comment about issues with software and hardware, that somehow is being painted as GrapheneOS fault, I mentioned (among other things) hardware hostile to non-stock OS.
I didn't say it's Nothing, I didn't name them.
You brought them up, so I addressed that, explained why I don't consider Nothing hostile but just vulnerable by default and inadequate. I even provided an example of the vendor I actually consider hostile (Samsung).
So if you understood quite well, you're trolling now and not discussing in the good faith.
The alternative is you didn't understand and thought I consider ALL vendors as hostile, which is putting claims in my mouth, which would be fine if you asked, but you keep discussing with strawman.
So please go bother someone else; this is the second time you're doing that and I wasted enough time on that.
skorp01 · · focus · HN ↗
Fully supporting and using AVB grants protection against persistence of *all* kinds. If an attacker gains privilege escalation through a remote attack, persistence become much easier if the system is not cryptographically verified every time the device boots.
Keystore and Attestation also rely on the bootloader being locked. If the hardware root of trust reports the device as untrusted, there is a broken chain of trust for biometrics, encrypted app data that uses the hardware keystore, and any form of attestation checks (like AOSP's Hardware Attestion API) will report the device as untrusted.
Going back to the first point, if it is possible to modify the system and gain persistence, there is also the possibility of modifying the kernel, which would allow an attacker to rewrite or patch the kernel, rendering AOSP's sandbox useless.
This would also make it more vulnerable to downgrade attacks because rollback protection is tied to a locked bootloader and AVB.
This could all be accomplished through remote exploitation. The "software side" you speak of is built atop AVB as a minimum requirement to assure that the software you're running is unmodified and intact.