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Weeping whales: Stillborn humpback whale grieving documented

243 points · 192 comments · wglb

georgemcbay · 1789884732 · focus · HN ↗
Blows my mind that so many people just have this hardened internalized idea that we're somehow significantly different than any other animal.
Sure, we've got them beat on language and planning, but we're currently in the process of being passed up on both those fronts by multi-dimensional arrays of floating point numbers sitting inside of sand. So, like, how special is that then, really?
1. sethammons · 1789896279 · focus · HN ↗
  We should start from the default assumption that other animals have a lived experience not unlike our own until proven otherwise.
  Mammal brains are similar between species. Show me why they wont behave like ours. Most say who say animals can't grieve are in the same boat with those who used to say human babies don't feel pain.
  Every time we look deeper, we find we humans are less special in any given quality. Yes, humans seem unique in our level of language and knowledge passing. For now; until we discover something else.
  Here is a studying on rats. They grieve. Brain, chemical, and social activity. <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12244160/" rel="nofollow">https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12244160/
  1. david-gpu · 1789898425 · focus · HN ↗
    > Most say who say animals can't grieve are in the same boat with those who used to say human babies don't feel pain.
    My dad was an anesthesiologist, and what he told me is rather different from that meme. The reason was that the safe dosing range for babies was unknown, and giving the wrong dose can lead to death or worse. The argument wasn't that babies couldn't feel pain, but that babies would not have lasting memories of it happening, and that it was less risky that overdosing them.
    card_zero · 1789902465 · focus · HN ↗
    You know, if there was a hypnotic drug such that I could be sure I'd remember nothing (and many, many similar caveats), I'd volunteer to be caused all kinds of pain, because I don't see why I should care. The only moral angle I can see is the question of who would want it and why. Research maybe? In of itself, it doesn't seem bad.
    thriftwy · 1789911211 · focus · HN ↗
    Isn't that the same as submitting your clone to fear and torment because you will not have a lasting memory of surviving all that?
    What's the practical difference other than timelike distance between you rather than spacelike distance?
    tenuousemphasis · 1789917069 · focus · HN ↗
    There's a great free Yale lecture series called Death that goes into this.
    <a href="https://oyc.yale.edu/philosophy/phil-176/lecture-12" rel="nofollow">https://oyc.yale.edu/philosophy/phil-176/lecture-12
    Version 1: A mad scientist swaps your mind with another person's (Linda's), then asks which resulting body he should torture. Intuition says spare the one with your personality, so personality looks like the key to identity.
    Version 2: He's going to torture you, but first gives you amnesia, then makes you believe you're Linda, then gives Linda your memories. Intuition says don't torture your body, so the body looks like the key.
    card_zero · 1789921290 · focus · HN ↗
    Premised on being utterly selfish and not caring about Linda.
    Leaving that aside, is this really a great and clever question? In version 2, your minds are swapped, so it's the same question. The difference is that you have been "driven crazy" and "deluded", but in what sense? If the objective is to avoid yourself being tortured, it's unclear which one is yourself, simply because the question relies on the unclear fictional process of "making you believe you're the other person", and the question itself implies you shouldn't trust that process.
    It could be made shorter: "A mad scientist comes along and does something mysterious, so that you might not be yourself any more! So, are you? Ah, you don't know! Gotcha!"
    The original is in Problems of the Self, 1973. (Or it's an essay titled The Self and The Future.) I've got hold of that, am reading. The original version is really long. The first six pages are just really making a meal out of describing all the ramifications of the simple sci-fi concept of a body swap.
    Yes, unfortunately it seems to be not very good. "He now further adds that at the moment of torture I shall not only not remember the things I am now in a position to remember, but will have a different set of impressions of my past, quite different from the memories I now have. I do not think that this would cheer me up, either." So, the problem with this is that it's nonsense, like saying "You are not you, but you are! Now if something happens to that person, does it happen to you?" Well I don't know, Bernard, it depends what your rather silly words mean. He's just playing the shell game with the word I.
    Then at the end (ten pages later) there's a messier version: "he could have gone on and produced two persons each with A-like character and memories, as well as one or two with B-like characteristics". So it seems that the confusion and non-neatness of the swap is the whole point. Thing is, I'm not even very concerned which one is me. I suppose, alright, I do prefer me-like characteristics. So I'll take the half-dozen clones who seem vaguely right, that's good enough for me. Whatever.

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